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ABSTRACT 
 
Political corruption is a cancer – a malignant phenomenon that affects every 
political system and every person in the world. Corruption undermines the very fabric of 
society and the faith of people in their government. It makes goods more expensive, 
stymies development in developing nations, and it makes both the United States and the 
world a more dangerous place. Because of its negative effects and universality, 
corruption should be studied. Its study leads to greater understanding, the discovery of 
effective approaches to prevention, and restored faith in political systems. Its study also 
illuminates and breaks down barriers to effective government while empowering officials 
who put constituents before themselves to act. In this analysis, modern literature and 
analyses are examined to gain better understanding of the nature and wider study of 
corruption, rankings of the American states are analyzed and a meta-study completed to 
rank the states along broader criteria, and one particular state – Florida – is examined 
closely as a case study in political corruption. Why Florida? Florida is the fourth largest 
state in the United States, has a racially and socioeconomically diverse population, and 
the highest number of convictions for corruption of any other state for the last decade. 
The result of this study is a deeper insight into political corruption as a field of study, 
better understanding of defining and measuring political corruption, and potential policy 
remedies to reduce it. The results come with implications for a wide variety of academic 
fields with vested interest in the study of political corruption along with nonacademic 
audiences seeking to rid themselves of this cancer of government. 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
The question of political corruption and its effect on the political process is a 
riddle as old as the study of politics itself. Corruption as an object of academic study is 
viewed through the lenses of many disciplines. Just a few of these approaches view 
political corruption as an economic problem, as a criminal problem, or also as an ethical 
or moral problem. While corruption is extensively studied, there is a perplexing data 
problem in the comparative study of corruption in American politics. The lack of 
comparative academic study is particularly true when comparing the relative political 
corruption between the 50 states (Goel & Nelson, 2011). A lone academic study 
completed in 2003 (Boylan & Long) measures the perceived political corruption based 
upon a survey of state house journalists. Another source of comparative corruption data is 
the U.S. Department of Justice’s Public Integrity Section, which compiles data related to 
federal corruption prosecutions by jurisdiction of U.S. Attorneys. The use of these two 
sources of data provide the framework for further study based upon data focused on state-
level perceptions (in the case of Boylan & Long) and data focused on federal corruption 
convictions from the U.S. Department of Justice, however both approaches arrive at very 
different conclusions when ranking states relative to corruption. An example of this is the 
U.S. Department of Justice (2007) showing Florida as the most corrupt state in the United 
States because Florida has the highest number of corruption convictions for the ten-year 
period preceding the report. When taking population into account and producing a per 
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capita corruption conviction ranking of the states, Florida drops to tenth most corrupt 
state (Marsh, 2008, WK3). The situation becomes more perplexing for researchers when 
states are ranked based upon journalist perceptions. In this model, Florida becomes the 
22nd most corrupt state (Boylan & Long, 2003). Still further complicating matters are 
independently produced, nonacademic state rankings such as the State Integrity 
Investigation (n.d.) that rank states based upon anti-corruption institutions and state laws 
related to transparency in government and public corruption. In a state ranking produced 
in 2011, Florida was the 33rd most corrupt state in the United States. This means that in a 
time period covering 1997-2011, Florida was simultaneously the 1st, the 10th, the 22nd, 
and the 33rd most corrupt state in the United States. Based upon this data discrepancy, 
further research is needed. The use of a meta-study approach for reconciling these 
divergent rankings may produce a more comprehensive ranking of the states in the 
United States. In addition to numerical indices, a comprehensive case study approach is 
useful in better understanding the anti-corruption institutions in a particular state will fill 
in the gaps left by the use of other ranking models. For purposes of this qualitative 
analysis, Florida was selected for two reasons: 1) its prominence in the rankings and 2) 
because Florida is representative of the United States as a whole. 
 
Florida – Political Free-for-All and Microcosm of the United States 
 
Florida is at the same time a unique entity among the states of the United States 
yet also representative of the nation as a whole. Since her discovery in 1513, Florida has 
been an exotic land of loblolly pine trees and dense palmetto forests, modern-day 
 3!
dinosaurs and space travel, and a cultural heritage rich in the spirit of adventure, the folly 
of fortune-seeking, and unique characters found in no other place on earth (Mormino, 
2005). The same spirit of adventure and treasure hunting that was manifested in Ponce de 
Leon’s Spanish conquistadors who became the first Europeans to lay their eyes upon the 
“land of flowers” endures to modern time. This sense of adventure and folly may also be 
seen in Florida’s culture, its history, and its politics. Florida is unique for a myriad of 
reasons, but few so much as its distinctive brand of politics (Colburn, 2007). In fact, 
Florida has often been the subject of jokes about what is wrong with American politics 
and cynical Tocquevilleian observations about the less-than-democratic nature of the 
Unites States’ democratic elections (The Economist, 2012). These jokes often involve the 
2000 presidential election recount in several Florida counties, but few so noteworthy as 
Broward and Palm Beach Counties and the distinctive cast of characters who 
accompanied the scandalous recount including former Secretary of State Katherine Harris 
and former Governor Jeb Bush. Also noteworthy is the unnamed Broward County 
elections official gone cross-eyed staring at a “hanging chad” through a magnifying glass 
who himself became a symbol for this recount. Other, more recent supporting members 
of Florida’s cast of political characters include Florida’s former governor Charlie Crist 
(Smith, 2006), disgraced and impeached federal judge-turned-congressman Alcee 
Hastings (Marcus, 1989), and one of only two sitting members of Congress to have flown 
in space, Senator Bill Nelson (Nelson & Buckingham, 1988) who did so while chair of 
NASA’s oversight subcommittee in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
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 Florida has a political culture unlike any other place in the United States. There 
are many reasons for this including Florida’s dramatic growth and the constant influx of 
new residents, single party rule for more than the last century (first Democrats and then 
Republicans), (Colburn, 2007)(Williamson, 1976) and the billions of dollars to be made 
both by selling every inch of beachfront property by snatching it from the pockets of 
unsuspecting tourists (Mormino, 2005), and incredible (seemingly one-sided) successful 
partnership between the Disney Corporation and the city of Orlando (Foglesong, 2001). 
The seminal expert on the politics of the Southern United States, V. O. Key, Jr. observes, 
“the search for coherent, organized political leadership in Florida seems futile in 
whatever direction one looks.” (Key, 1949) Key also goes on: 
 
The unorganized condition of Florida politics manifests itself also in the fact that 
candidates for the national house and Senate operate independently of each other 
and of candidates for the governorship and other state offices. This political 
individualism gives great weight to factors such as personality and skill on the 
stump. In the confusion of individual candidacies, consistency by the electorate is 
purely fortuitous. In fact, the more general consequence is that the only genuine 
choice is between personalities who struggle simply to make themselves known, 
and not disagreeably. When opportunity for meaningful choice arises its existence 
is often concealed. (Key, 1949) 
 
 
 
The untamed, unsettled, ‘Wild West’ style of Florida politics to which Key 
alluded – more than 60 years ago – is as much the rule now as it was then, with few 
differences. Over time, Florida has changed and reformed the ways in which elections are 
held and implemented term limits for state officials. In many ways, Florida has been on 
the cutting edge of governmental and public service reform for several reasons, but 
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namely due to the creativity and progressive nature of Florida’s corrupt public officials 
and special interests – rapidly finding paths around newly-implemented reforms 
(MacKay & Edmonds, 2010, p. 13-18). 
 
Also necessary to understanding Florida’s politics is the fact that the landmass 
was first ruled by indigenous peoples, then claimed by Spain, then Britain, the Spain 
again, the United States, the Confederate States, and then once again by the United States 
(Gannon, 2003). According to the State Constitutional Revisions Commission, Florida’s 
government has also been organized under five state constitutions: adopted in 1838, 
1861, 1865, 1868, and most recently in 1968 (Statutes and Constitution, 1998). This past 
political instability, combined with contemporary Florida’s population imported from 
other states and countries has resulted in the phenomenon described by V. O. Key (1949), 
a state without political organization and little loyalty within its political system. Yet 
inexplicably, it may seem, Florida may be home to some of the most organized, systemic 
political corruption in the United States – some of which brought about by well-
intentioned reforms designed to reduce political corruption (Dyckman, 2008). The notion 
of Florida as a land of massive profit potential with little work and a place where one 
need not be an insider to get ahead has produced massive booms in Florida’s economy 
(Mormino, 2005). Florida’s economic booms typically involve the intersection of tourism 
and real estate where vacationers are afforded the opportunity to ‘buy a piece of paradise” 
(Mormino, 2005). Inevitably residential builders, real estate agents, and commercial 
developers reap the profits of these enterprises in favorable economic times. Indeed 
Florida’s economy itself is structured for good economic times and ill prepared to fund 
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state, county, and municipal governments during an economic downturn. During the 
period of sustained growth from 1970 through 2000, Florida’s population grew from 
approximately 6,791,000 residents to 15,982,000 residents – an increase of more than 235 
percent (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)(Dye, Jewett & MacManus, 2007). Additionally, an 
April 2006 report in Florida Trend magazine estimated that Florida’s population once 
had a daily gain of 1,890 residents, the loss of 945 residents, and 115 births (minus 
deaths) for an average daily increase of 1,060 residents (Dye, et al., 2007). This stunning, 
sustained growth easily explains the reluctant attitudes of Florida’s political leaders in 
working for diversification and sustainability in Florida’s economy and tax structure. The 
rootlessness of Florida’s population, the lack of organization and an every-man-for-
himself attitude has opened the door to the reputation of a high level of public corruption 
and improper influence – as evidenced by the books of authors like Carl Hiaasen and the 
unflattering “Florida” category of news stories on blogs such as Fark and Gawker. 
Combining this perception with well-intentioned legislation related to term limits has 
further served to empower nonelected political actors including lobbyists, political 
consultants, and career legislative staff who never seem to actually leave the capital, 
Tallahassee (Carsey & Nelson, 2008, p. 108) (Wagner & Prier, 2008, p. 159-160). The 
end result of this atmosphere is a political system ripe for the picking.  
While Florida’s political system is very much a free-for-all influence market 
(Johnston, 2005), it has seen entrenched power structures come and go, typically at the 
hand of demographic, not democratic, change (Dye, et al., 2008). Such an example of an 
entrenched power structure was Florida’s “Pork Chop Gang,” a group of legislators 
representing rural areas and counties with small populations (Colburn, 2007, p. 33). 
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Through the control of the legislative district apportionment process via seniority and 
gerrymandering, these legislators were able to devote much of Florida’s budget to rural 
areas and advance a regressive policy opposed to civil rights, desegregation, and public 
service reforms throughout much of the 19050s (Colburn, 2007) (MacKay & Edmonds, 
2010) (Karl, 2010). Since the time of the pork chop gang, Florida has experienced 
sweeping changes to the method and results of the reapportionment process, but none that 
has resulted in true depoliticalization of reapportionment itself (Associated Press, 2012). 
In today’s Florida, voter demographics and party affiliation have changed in such a way 
as to give the Democratic Party a nearly 560,000 voter registration majority over the 
Republican Party (NVRA Statistics, 2013), which currently holds 76 out of 120 seats in 
the Florida House of Representatives (Florida House of Representatives, 2012). It is 
likely that Republican control of the reapportionment process has resulted in this 
disproportionate representation in Florida just as the efforts of the pork chop gang did in 
the 1950s.  
 
Moving forward from an often-hateful history of discrimination, 
disenfranchisement, and prejudice (Dyckman, 2006, 2008, and 2011) (Warren, 2008), 
Florida has experienced massive cultural changes as the population has grown (Dye, et 
al., 2008). What was once the least populated state of the old Confederacy (Colburn & 
deHaven-Smith, 2002) now boasts the fourth largest population of any state and is soon 
to overtake New York to become the third most populous state in the United States 
(Morel, 2013). These changes have brought with them their own growing pains as 
Florida’s resources, infrastructure, and government are stressed to the maximum to 
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accommodate the influx of new residents. These changes have also resulted in a lack of 
cultural identity for native Floridians, who make up less than 25% of the state’s 
population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013) (Colburn & deHaven-Smith, 2002). With nearly 
three-quarters of the population coming from another state or country, Floridians develop 
a regional identity based upon the part of the state in which they find themselves. There 
are few clearer indicators of identity than a recent data analysis completed by Facebook 
(Taylor, 2013) that breaks down fans of NFL teams by the county in which they live. 
Florida is a state with three professional football teams: the Jacksonville Jaguars, the 
Tampa Bay Buccaneers, and the Miami Dolphins. However, this Facebook analysis finds 
that, while there are large, healthy pockets of fans for each of these teams, there are also 
entire counties where the most popular NFL team is not the home team, but rather the 
Pittsburgh Steelers, the New York Giants, the New Orleans Saints, the Dallas Cowboys, 
or the New England Patriots (Taylor, 2013). Interestingly enough, this out of state team 
loyalty fits with the locations from which new Florida residents started out: 25% from the 
Northeast, 14.6% from other Southern states, and 23% from states outside the South or 
Northeast (such as the Midwest) (Colburn & deHaven-Smith, 2002). These places are 
otherwise known as Giants, Patriots, Saints, and Steelers territory. This Facebook 
analysis also reveals that certain football teams know no geographical limitations when it 
comes to their fan base: the Dallas Cowboys and the Pittsburgh Steelers. Given resident 
populations of Florida residents who are dedicated fans of these NFL teams, we can only 
presume that this is yet another indicator of Florida’s place as a reflection of the United 
States at large.  
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It is also possible to view Florida as reflective of the larger nation when 
considering the outcome of presidential elections. Florida sided with the eventual winner 
of the five most recent presidential elections (2012, 2008, 2004, 2000, and 1996). 
Excluding 1992, this streak includes the elections in 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, and 1988 – 
meaning Florida has helped to decide the eventual winner of the White House in 10 out 
of the last 11 presidential elections. Going back even further, one has to look at the 
presidential election of 1924 to find another election in which the state did not pick the 
winner giving Florida the distinction of making the same choice as the entire country in 
20 of the last 22 elections, or 90.9% of the time (270 To Win, 2012). It has been argued 
that Florida is a must win state simply because of the sheer number of Electoral College 
votes it brings to the table – 29 after the 2010 reapportionment. However, in elections 
prior to the 1960s, Florida had a paltry 10 Electoral College votes (270 To Win, 2012) 
making the state just another Southern state.  
 
 Taking all of this into consideration, we are left to wonder what Florida’s 
swashbuckling culture, huge population, diversity, and political culture all have to do 
with political corruption in the United States. All of these things combine to make Florida 
an almost ideal laboratory for studying political corruption in the United States. In the 
rankings studied as part of this analysis, we find that Florida is roughly in the middle of 
all of the other states when it comes to the question of corruption except for one issue: 
Florida has the highest number of federal convictions for political corruption of any state 
in the United States for the years 1998 through 2007 (U.S. Department of Justice, 2007). 
This window is significant because it provides a contextual window around the only 
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comparative academic study available (Boylan & Long, 2003). According to this measure 
of federal convictions, Florida is theoretically by far the most corrupt state in the country. 
Does this mean that convictions are emblematic of an even larger corruption problem or a 
sign that the problem has been solved since corrupt individuals have been brought to 
justice? Are Florida anti-corruption laws so hopelessly ineffective and corruption so 
rampant that this is just the tip of the iceberg or are Florida’s institutions perfectly suited 
to deal with the deeply insidious problem of political corruption? Through the astounding 
and sometimes amusing adventure that is research in political corruption, we will discuss 
contemporary thought in political corruption along with comparative models with an 
international and human security focus into the topic. We will also complete a meta-
analysis of how the states are ranked from most to least corrupt and the criteria used for 
such a ranking – demonstrating that purely quantitative measures of corruption (i.e. 
convictions) do not paint a complete picture of comparative corruption in the United 
States. Lastly, we will review Florida’s approach to political corruption through its laws, 
institutions, and case studies of both legitimate political corruption and events that can be 
perceived as political corruption.  
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CHAPTER TWO – MODERN THOUGHT IN CORRUPTION STUDIES 
 
Political Corruption – Diversified Fields and Diversified Opinions 
 
If the study of politics is in fact the study of power, then certainly the corruption 
of legitimate political authority becomes a central theme of political inquiry. In this way, 
political corruption is a recurring theme in many seemingly unrelated political topics. 
Conversely, this study is focused on analyzing political corruption within the United 
States of America with a particular focus on the state of Florida. To this end, it is 
necessary to visit the liberal political theories that gave rise to the desire for the former 
American colonies to become independent and the subsequent political theories 
addressing the development of a new American democracy from its infancy to present 
day. In a story well-known and well-tested among students of American politics and 
history, the framers of the American constitution viewed the corruption of the ruling 
system of government of the United Kingdom as a catalyst for independence. The 
accusation of “taxation without representation” was itself a criticism of an unfair, 
aristocratic system of government thrust upon what had been a nation of loyal followers 
of the British crown. Rather than representation by elected representatives of the people 
themselves, governors ruled colonies with only a minor role for assemblies of elected 
residents. With all of the meaningful political power in a colony resting with the colonial 
governor, the assemblies were unable to go against the will of this executive without 
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resorting to a Lockeian argument over the legitimacy of the governor’s powers and the 
consent of the governed (Berkin, Miller, Cherny, & Gormly, 2006). These early 
rejections of imperial power set the stage for the American suspicion of those in power 
along with rudimentary safeguards against the perceived corruption of the colonial 
system. From these beginnings, the United States grew into a system of elected 
government at the national, state, and local levels. With democracy, however, came new 
problems and new corruption. However, American independence left the young nation 
with the same corruption that had existed before independence: bribery, legislative 
logrolling, foreign influence of elected officials, clandestine monitoring of political 
opponents’ offices, and the ever-changing issues surrounding campaign finances 
(Johnston, 2005, p. 64). 
 
An interesting fact about American political corruption is its regular resurgence. 
According to Sabato and Simpson’s history on the subject (1996, p.16), there has been a 
major national scandal every fifty years since 1872: the Credit Mobilier scandal (1872-
1873), the Teapot Dome scandal (1923-1924), and Watergate (1972-1974). Not 
mentioned in this book are scandals involving the alleged perjury of President Bill 
Clinton in 1998 (Foerstel, 2001). The pace of national scandals seems to have only 
accelerated with the information age and the dawn of the 24-hour news cycle. Combining 
this with the amateurization of political journalism – the idea that anybody with a 
computer and a free blog is a political journalist – has also resulted in a sea change in 
how Americans approach their politics (H. Thomas, 2006). Further muddying the waters 
is the effect of gerrymandered ‘safe’ Congressional districts sending ever more polarized 
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representatives to Washington, DC. This gives us an atmosphere where collaboration is 
discouraged. It gives us an atmosphere where the political process is no longer about 
results, but winning news cycles or defeating an idea formulated by the opposition. An 
atmosphere of vitriol where everybody is a journalist looking for a ‘gotcha moment’ and 
breaking a story about some politician or official from the other party’s misdeeds, 
misquotes, or unsavory distant past (E. Thomas, 2004, p. 51). The odd thing about all of 
this – our great modern age of bitter brinksmanship in the political arena – is that this 
isn’t anything new (Berkin, et al. 2006). The key differences are the speed at which 
information is distributed and the number of zeros behind the amounts of money spent. 
We also seem to have advanced well past the point of sanctioned executions and dueling 
politicians because of simple policy disagreements – though if only barely (Read, 2013). 
 
Taking this altogether, we are left to wonder: what is the state of research in the 
subfield of political corruption? It is first important to examine why we spend so much 
time and effort researching and analyzing corruption. Simply put, the reason political 
scientists study political corruption is because it affects the lives of every person in every 
country in the world. Political corruption in one form or another is a universal concept 
that transcends language, culture, ethnicity, religion, and any number of other 
characteristics that differentiate person from person and country from country. 
Corruption also brings with it considerable cost. Transparency International (n.d.) 
describes the cost of corruption this way: 
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The cost of corruption is four-fold: political, economic, social, and 
environmental. On the political front, corruption constitutes a major obstacle to 
democracy and the rule of law. In a democratic system, offices and institutions 
lose their legitimacy when they are misused for private advantage. Though this is 
harmful in the established democracies, it is even more so in newly emerging 
ones. Accountable political leadership cannot develop in a corrupt climate. 
Economically, corruption leads to the depletion of national wealth. It is often 
responsible for the funneling of scarce public resources to uneconomic high-
profile projects, such as dams, power plants, pipelines and refineries, at the 
expense of less spectacular but fundamental infrastructure projects such as 
schools, hospitals and roads, or the supply of power and water to rural areas. 
Furthermore, it hinders the development of fair market structures and distorts 
competition, thereby deterring investment. The effect of corruption on the social 
fabric of society is the most damaging of all. It undermines people's trust in the 
political system, in its institutions and its leadership. Frustration and general 
apathy among a disillusioned public result in a weak civil society. That in turn 
clears the way for despots as well as democratically elected yet unscrupulous 
leaders to turn national assets into personal wealth. Demanding and paying bribes 
become the norm. Those unwilling to comply often emigrate, leaving the country 
drained of its most able and most honest citizens. Environmental degradation is 
yet another consequence of corrupt systems. The lack of, or non-enforcement of, 
environmental regulations and legislation has historically allowed the North to 
export its polluting industry to the South. At the same time, careless exploitation 
of natural resources, from timber and minerals to elephants, by both domestic and 
international agents has led to ravaged natural environments. Environmentally 
devastating projects are given preference in funding, because they are easy targets 
for siphoning off public money into private pockets. (Transparency International, 
2000) 
 
While the United States experiences political corruption differently from the developing 
world, many of the effects remain the same (Johnson, LaFountain & Yamarik, 2011). 
This is particularly true in the case of the eroding trust in government and elected 
leadership. Studying political corruption is not easy and researchers are often challenged 
to define corruption, devise a plan for measuring it, and finding a research design that is 
both precise and can be replicated. Large nongovernmental organizations such as 
Transparency International and Global Integrity study corruption, but do so based upon 
polling and the measured perception of political corruption. Perception is often used in 
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lieu of event-based data because little to no data exists on corrupt activities (Global 
Integrity, 2011). Generally, corrupt police officers do not record, report, and tally the 
bribes they receive each day. This presents considerable data problems for researchers 
seeking to gain a better understanding of the prevalence of corruption or even to establish 
a baseline before testing a reform. This dichotomy between perception and action gives 
us a quandary as researchers. We have to ask which came first: the corruption or the 
perception? It’s an academic version of the classic chicken or the egg dilemma. 
Nongovernmental organizations have answered this question in their own way. For 
example, Transparency International (2000) uses a perception index combined with an 
analysis of each country’s institutions to determine which country is the most corrupt. 
Instead of focusing on a pure comparative study of corruption, some researchers have 
instead dedicated themselves to researching the causes and motivations of corrupt actors, 
while others seek to find new and unique ways in which corrupt political actors gain 
private benefit from their public service.  
 
 Perhaps the greatest advantage for this broadly defined subfield of political 
science lies in its relative lack of clear data points or concrete indicators of corruption. 
The study of corruption is hardly unique to political scientists and has yielded a variety of 
study in several disciplines. There have been economic studies examining the effect of 
corruption on anything from the utilization of World Bank funds in developing nations to 
the effects of corruption on the bottom lines of multinational corporations. There is a line 
of thought that the predictability of corrupt behaviors such as bribery bring order and are 
both a stabilizing force and a beneficial factor in developing countries (Huntington, 
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1968). There are studies in the field of journalism analyzing how news coverage of 
scandals has changed over time (Foerstel, 2001) and how media coverage affects public 
opinion and broader civic life (McCombs, Holbert, Kiousis, & Wanta, 2011). 
Criminology studies have also been completed looking at corruption as a white-collar 
crime (Brightman & Howard, 2009). Studies of corruption and corrupt actors also exist in 
African-American studies where institutionalized harassment of black elected officials 
has affected the country as a whole (Musgrove, 2012). These studies do not reflect the 
large number of studies that include corruption in other subfields of political science. In 
fact, each of the forty-three organized sections of the American Political Science 
Association (n.d.) could, should, and has studied corruption within their own subfield. 
This richly diverse field of study has truly yielded insight into just how universal the 
effects of corruption can be in a wide variety of academic fields. 
 
 The academic study of political corruption brings to the table a rich variety of 
literature from many different academic disciplines. For political scientists, the primary 
focus of discussion regarding political corruption boils down to three key questions: 1) 
how does one define corruption, 2) how does one measure corruption, and 3) is 
corruption in one country equivalent to corruption in another? There are relatively few 
topics within political science as controversial and ill defined as is political corruption. In 
fact, the relatively clear definitions of other topics in political science make the field 
especially accessible to researchers – that is in situations where criteria and measures are 
firmly defined. Researchers measuring electoral performance have innumerable 
quantitative indicators at their disposal: vote counts, voter turnout percentages, 
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demographics, and political ideology expressed through voter registration data. Those 
who analyze and research public law have case law, statutes, and legal opinions from the 
judges who make each decision. Those who study political economy have tremendous 
resources in the form of economic performance data available to study the effects of 
changes within a state’s economy. Conversely, those who study political corruption at 
any level are left with few choices for establishing concrete criteria that are comparable 
across states, precise, and skewed one way or the other by the very corruption being 
measured.  
 
 Attempts at isolating and measuring actual corruption within a state can reasonably 
be compared to tracking and apprehending a skilled jewel thief. In fact, a review of recent 
literature (Johnson, LaFountain & Yamarik, 2011), (Alt & Lassen, 2007), and (Goel & 
Nelson, 2010) shows the most common source of measureable data for studying 
comparative political corruption between the 50 American states is the U.S. Department 
of Justice’s Public Integrity Section’s annual report to Congress listing the total number 
of convictions for federal corruption offenses by U.S. District Attorney’s jurisdiction 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2007). Another study (Boylan & Long, 2003) compiled a 
survey of journalists from each of the 50 states and ranked the states based upon this 
perception. Goel and Nelson (2011) go so far as to say “surveys of corruption perceptions 
for the United States have been nonexistent until a recent survey by Boylan and Long 
(2003) of state house journalists regarding their perceptions of corruption.” With this lack 
of meaningful academic survey data, researchers are forced to rely on data covering 
federal convictions that do not account for the state-level crimes, local crimes, and 
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violations of codes of ethics – all of which could constitute acts of political corruption 
that would go unreported by the Department of Justice in its annual report. Such is the 
case; future studies of comparative corruption in the United States must look beyond 
federal convictions and the 2003 survey to meet the needs of rigorous studies and 
analyses into this topic. 
 
Defining Political Corruption – Issues in Operationalization  
 
 As a subject, political corruption is a concept that is both universally understood, 
yet poorly defined. One can easily conceive of political corruption as simple bribery, 
awarding contracts to family or friends without competition, or circumventing legal 
processes for personal benefit. As a subject, a layperson sees corruption as activity that is 
clearly ethically wrong – particularly in democratic nations (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 
However, for one to fully understand the concept of corruption and to move forward with 
analyzing the subject, a clear definition is needed. In fact, the creation of a definition 
presents many challenges to both researchers and policymakers endeavoring to reduce 
corruption. Petter Langseth, the Programme Manager of the United Nations’ Global 
Programme against Corruption had this to say about defining corruption during the 
United Nations’ early steps in formulating its approach to combating corruption (2006, p. 
9): 
There is no single, comprehensive, universally accepted definition of 
corruption. Attempts to develop such a definition invariably encounter legal, 
criminological and, in many countries, political problems. 
When the negotiations of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption began in early 2002, one option under consideration was not to define 
corruption at all but to list specific types or acts of corruption. Moreover, 
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proposals to require countries to criminalise corruption mainly covered specific 
offences that depended on what type of conduct was involved, whether those 
implicated were public officials, whether cross-border conduct or foreign officials 
were involved and if the cases related to unlawful or improper enrichment. 
(Langseth, 2006, p. 9) 
 
As one can imagine, working toward international agreement on any subject is a difficult 
undertaking. This is especially true of political corruption as many of the same officials 
improperly benefiting from their public offices may be the same officials on a UN 
commission defining and investigating corruption. The choice to not define corruption as 
a broader concept is a logical response to resistance one might encounter from corrupt 
officials who find themselves included in such a definition.  
 
 Laura S. Underkuffler (2009 p. 28) discusses further difficulties in defining 
corruption beyond the applied issues of enlisting assistance from officials who may be 
included in such a definition:  
 
A uniform understanding of corruption has not emerged from these academic 
efforts. Although there is popular understanding of corruption that is shared by 
politicians, journalists, and the ‘man on the street,’ academic theorists have 
advanced a multiplicity of meanings, with more or less scrutiny or explicit 
understanding of the underlying idea. (Underkuffler, 2009, p. 28) 
 
Underkuffler goes on to discuss several approaches to definitions of corruption along the 
lines of a public duty, as an economic behavior, and as a primarily illegal activity (among 
several other approaches). Ultimately though, none of the approaches discussed in the 
chapter include the morality and ethics of corrupt behavior itself. Underkuffler argues 
that the base of corrupt behavior is the morality of the individual undertaking corrupt 
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behavior and that only through a moralistic approach to the issue can full understanding, 
and ultimately meaningful approaches to prevention, occur. This is particularly 
significant as the public conceives of corruption as an immoral activity (Underkuffler, 
2009, p. 37-41). In closing, Underkuffler explains:  
 
This view [of corruption as an issue of morality] tells us that until we come to 
grips with the moral dimensions of this problem, our prescriptions for attacking 
this phenomenon will miss the essence of what popular attitudes may correctly 
recognize as the underlying problem, and the composition of the distinctly 
‘corrupt’ core. (Underkuffler, 2009, p. 42) 
 
 
 Pivoting from the academic debate surrounding a definition of corruption, we 
come to the world of two prominent nongovernmental organizations: Global Integrity and 
Transparency International.  While a clear definition for corruption does not appear on 
Global Integrity’s website (2013), the organization currently evaluates and ranks selected 
nation states along the lines of relative corruption using a combination institution-based 
approach for “quantitative” data, a “qualitative” peer-reviewed essay discussing the 
effects of corruption on every day life written by a reporter based within a particular 
country, and a chronology of nationwide corruption events prepared by the central 
organization (Global Integrity, 2013). From this point, the information is aggregated into 
a score and nations are ranked based upon this score. Global Integrity argues that because 
it uses an experimental model for evaluating corruption that focuses on institutions and 
specific corrupt actions, its evaluations are more robust and credible than findings from 
other organizations (Global Integrity, 2013). Conversely, Transparency International, 
another global nongovernmental organization that also measures and evaluates states 
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based upon corruption does not share Global Integrity’s reluctance to provide a clear 
definition of corruption, listing the organization’s definition at the top of its “Frequently 
Asked Questions” page on its website: 
 
Generally speaking as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. Corruption 
can be classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of 
money lost and the sector where it occurs. 
 
Grand corruption consists of acts committed at a high level of government that 
distort policies or the central functioning of the state, enabling leaders to benefit at 
the expense of the public good. 
 
Petty corruption refers to everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- and mid-
level public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens, who often are 
trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police 
departments and other agencies. 
 
Political corruption is a manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of 
procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision 
makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth. 
(Transparency International, n.d.) 
 
 
Combining the role of public office, the notion of personal gain, and issues of ethics and 
morality, perhaps the best operational definition for corruption would be the immoral use 
of political power or authority for personal gain.  
 
The Ideal World – International Models for Combating Corruption 
 
 Transparency International and the National Integrity System - Florida’s 
government has taken several steps to provide for an open, transparent government in 
light of several past political and judicial scandals (Dyckman, 2008). These reforms, 
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which began with the state’s revised 1968 state constitutional convention (Statutes and 
Constitution, 1998) closely mirror those suggested in the National Integrity System 
developed by the nongovernmental organization Transparency International and 
described in its “TI Sourcebook 2000” (Transparency International, 2000) publication. 
The National Integrity System forms the basis for Transparency International’s 
evaluations on the relative ‘corruptness’ of each national political system. The National 
Integrity System forms a blueprint for a national governmental system that uses 
accountability to reduce or eliminate political corruption within a government. 
Transparency International argues that each “pillar” demonstrates a “holistic approach to 
countering corruption” (Transparency International, 2000). As one can see from the 
following diagram provided on the Transparency International website, it is believed that 
adhering to the pillars of the NIS will result in the rule of law reigning supreme, 
sustainable development, and a higher quality of life.  
 
Figure 2.1, Pillars of the National Integrity System 
(Transparency International, 2000) 
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The National Integrity System model uses a number of pillars resting upon the foundation 
of existing political, sociological, and economic institutions within a particular state. 
From this foundation, the model extends several pillars that are designed to represent 
political reforms that will reduce corruption or enhance governmental accountability 
within a state. From the 2000 TI Sourcebook, the National Integrity System pillar system 
is indicated as follows: 
 
Table 2.1, The National Integrity System Pillars Explained 
Institutional Pillar Corresponding Core Rules/Practices 
Executive Conflict of interest rules 
Legislative/Parliament Fair elections 
Public Accounts Committee (of legislature) Power to question senior officials 
Auditor General Public reporting 
Public service Public service ethics 
Judiciary Independence 
Media Access to information 
Civil society Freedom of speech 
Ombudsman Records management 
Anti-corruption/watchdog agencies Enforceable and enforced laws 
Private sector Competition policy, including public procurement rules 
International community Effective legal/judicial assistance 
(Transparency International, 2000) 
 
One can easily see that these common sense institutional reforms could result in a lower 
level of political corruption and can be applied to any state. To this end, we will apply 
this model to Florida’s political institutions. In our examination of Florida’s political 
system, one will see that Transparency International’s National Integrity System model is 
lacking in several key areas. Despite having established strong institutions reflective of 
those in Transparency International’s National Integrity System model, Florida is a state 
dominated by single-party rule in which instances of political corruption and influence 
peddling are quite frequent (Colburn, 2007) (Key, 1949) (State Integrity Investigation, 
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2012). In the National Integrity System model provided by Transparency International, 
(2000) it is quite apparent that National Integrity System both maintains a focus on 
developing nations and is designed to benefit every other country wishing to further 
strengthen its defenses against political corruption and to make corruption a “high risk, 
low reward” enterprise.  
 
 The United Nations Human Security Model - The Human Security Model is a 
framework for approaching and understanding the relative security and stability of a 
particular region or state. The United Nations Development Programme’s 1994 Human 
Development Report first described this model (United Nations, 1994). The Human 
Security Model is distinctive for several reasons. First, it represents progress in the field 
of human development and a new approach to the issues of stability in not just the 
developing world. Second, the framework can be used to evaluate the relative stability of 
any country in the world. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the model approaches 
issues of stability from a participant perspective rather than the institution-based 
perspectives of the Global Integrity, Transparency International, and State Integrity 
Investigation models. While this is a largely qualitative model for understanding 
development and stability issues, political corruption included, it does offer researchers 
another lens through which to view perplexing political problems. For those who have 
studied ethics and psychology, the various elements of the Human Security Model bear a 
slight resemblance to the low to medium priority level of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
(Maslow, 1970) in which the need for safety and security manifest once healthy 
physiological functioning is assured. From the original 1994 United Nations Human 
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Development Report, these are the elements of the Human Security Model (brief 
explanations from Henk, 2005): 
 
Table 2.2, Elements of the Human Security Model 
ELEMENT EXPLANATION 
  
Economic Security Economic security requires an assured basic income – usually from 
productive and remunerative work, or in the last resort from some 
publicly financed safety net. 
Food Security Food security means that all people at all times have both physically and 
economic access to basic food. 
Health Security Health security is access to protections from diseases and unhealthy 
lifestyles. 
Environmental Security Environmental security is protection for people from short- and long-term 
ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature, and deterioration of the 
natural environment. 
Personal Security Personal security is protection for people from physical violence, whether 
from the state, from external states, from violent individuals and sub-state 
actors, from domestic abuse, from predatory adults, or even from the 
individual himself (as in protection from suicide). 
Community Security Community security is protection for people from the loss of traditional 
relationships and values and from sectarians and ethnic violence. 
Political Security Political security is the assurance that people live in a society that honors 
their basic human rights. 
(United Nations, 1994) and (Henk, 2005) 
 
Even a slight grounding in the psychology of the needs of political actors is worthy of 
consideration in a model such as this. Interestingly enough, the issue of protection from 
political corruption potentially fits into every element of the Human Security Model. 
Political corruption in the form of corrupt governmental officials can disrupt private 
property rights and damage the local economy, disrupting economic security. Political 
corruption can endanger food security when international aid shipments are seized and 
resold by corrupt actors. Both health and environmental security are put at risk when 
health and environmental protection officials can be bribed. Personal and community 
security are certainly endangered in the face of police corruption. Lastly, even the 
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perception of political corruption is enough to disrupt political security within a 
developing nation. Taking all of this together, the human security model seemingly 
places a high priority on combating and preventing political corruption by recognizing its 
corrosive role within developing societies. But is an international model for measuring 
developing nations applicable to individual states within a country like the United States? 
The answer to this question is an unequivocal yes, because every nation and every 
subdivision thereof ought to be measured using the same rubric for the simple reason that 
unless we evaluate a state’s institutions, we may never know what may be missing. 
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CHAPTER THREE – COMPARING THE STATES 
 
 
Get In Line: Ranking the States 
 
 
It seems that no scholarly work discussing political corruption is complete 
without a brief discussion of the obstacles facing those who research this subject. 
Completing comparative studies in political corruption across the United States presents a 
myriad of challenges to researchers. While the problems are many, there are two primary 
concerns surrounding the study of political corruption. The first, and perhaps most 
daunting is that political corruption is unseemly behavior that is more often than not 
illegal. Therefore, it comes as no great surprise that corrupt political actors are not eager 
to share their sketchy actions with academic researchers (Berlinski, 2009). The second, 
more academic concern is the method by which corruption is measured and standardized 
across all 50 states (Lancaster and Montinola, 2001). This topic is complicated by several 
overlapping legal systems that all treat corruption differently. Still further complicating 
matters is the dichotomy between federal, state, and local rules and regulations related to 
appropriations, campaign finance, and lobbying (Tavits, 2007). To illustrate: candidates 
for public office in Florida on the same November ballot could be subject to the rules and 
regulations of the Federal Elections Commission, the Florida Elections Commission, the 
Florida Commission on Ethics, and the elections governing body of individual counties 
and cities. Behaviors permissible under the jurisdiction of one set of rules may not be 
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legal activities under another governing body. Combining disparate laws on what 
constitutes corruption, a variety of regulatory bodies on campaign activity, and 
candidates routinely seeking different levels of political office opens the door for what 
may be considered a corrupt action under one system, but legal under another. An 
additional complication for comparative studies is an operational definition of political 
corruption itself. Is political corruption limited only to campaign funding and influencing 
voters? Is corruption a clear-cut phenomenon with identified motive, intent, and a clear 
quid pro quo? Perhaps corruption is more insidious: a discount for local zoning board 
members at a restaurant so the owner can get extra time to argue their perspective on a 
zoning law, free carwashes for law enforcement officers at a particular gas station with a 
chronic problem with loiterers, or a free oil change for city fleet managers at a car 
dealership with a large fleet sales presence. Would these actions in and of themselves not 
lay the groundwork for the perception of corruption or are they simply sound networking 
by involved citizens? Examples such as these further demonstrate the challenges facing 
corruption researchers.  
 
For purposes of this analysis, several comparative rankings of domestic political 
corruption in the United States will be evaluated. The first of these, the State Integrity 
Investigation, is a joint project between the Center for Public Integrity, the 
nongovernmental organization Global Integrity, and Public Radio International. The State 
Integrity Investigation created a standardized formula measuring the anticorruption 
measures of each state in an effort to compare them. From there, the organization reviews 
the results with political experts and journalists in each state to produce an aggregate 
 29!
score relative to the political corruption in each state. The rankings are highly publicized 
by the organization in an effort to lobby state legislatures and Congress to implement 
more stringent anticorruption laws and other measures aimed at increasing transparency 
in government. However, Integrity Florida has recently come under heavy criticism for 
the appearance of partisan activity in accepting support from a partisan organization and 
now serves as a sort of cautionary tale for aspiring reformers due to the ensuring scandal 
– namely when it comes to accepting donations from advocacy groups for sponsored 
research. 
 
The next state ranking is a study published in 2003 by the journal State Politics & 
Policy Quarterly (Boylan & Long, 2003). This ranking is based upon the results of a 
survey of journalists asking them to rate their state based upon corruption perception and 
a trailblazer in domestic comparative corruption studies as surveys were “nonexistent” 
until this one was published (Goel & Nelson, 2011). A peer-reviewed journal, State 
Politics & Policy Quarterly is affiliated with the American Political Science Association 
and is the official journal of the organized section of researchers dedicated to the study of 
state politics and policy. Neither the journal nor the American Political Science 
Association advocate specific remedies or initiatives based upon the findings of any 
research contained within this or any other affiliated journal.  
 
 The next two state rankings are compiled based upon the same data provided 
annually by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Public Integrity Section. The primary data 
from this report provides the total number of convictions for public corruption offenses 
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prosecuted by United States Attorneys and is divided up by federal district. The report 
provides data for a ten-year window. For our purposes, we will be using the report issued 
to Congress in 2008, which contains data from 1997 through 2007. This will place the 
Boylan and Long survey data roughly in the middle of the time period analyzed by the 
Department of Justice. The total numbers were divided into per capita numbers by state 
for an article that appeared in the New York Times (Marsh, 2008, WK3). The use of a 
journalistic source for this study illustrates the role the media plays in advancing debate 
and policies related to corruption (Charron, 2009)(McCombs, et al., 2011). It also further 
underscores the lack of meaningful indices measuring public corruption in the United 
States. Generally, corruption policy is a fairly low priority that only becomes prominent 
after a scandal breaks. Such an example is the judiciary reform efforts in Florida 
following widespread issues involving the Florida Supreme Court (Dyckman, 2008). 
Additionally, relying on conviction criteria that does not account for accusations that 
were not sustained, states where certain corrupt activities are not actually illegal, and 
other similar standardization concerns. The article also does not clearly illustrate that the 
convictions were for individuals convicted of crimes related to corruption who were not 
necessarily public officials themselves. 
 
In addition to the State Integrity Investigation, rankings of states based upon total 
convictions for corruption offenses, states ranked by per capita political corruption 
convictions, and the state-by-state journalist polling studies to be explored in depth, there 
are two internationally focused anticorruption models to be considered when approaching 
questions of comparative political corruption. Both international models support similar 
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anticorruption measures and approach the question in a qualitative fashion, but from 
varying perspectives. The first of these, Transparency International’s National Integrity 
System views the issue of political corruption through an official or institution centric 
perspective with the hypothesis that a well regulated political system with a strong code 
of ethics will result in fewer instances of political corruption. The second of these, the 
United Nations Human Security Model relies on a population-centric model wherein 
improving the human security of a particular population will result in lower instances of 
political corruption while improving quality of life.  
 
 Institutions First: The Findings of the State Integrity Investigation - The State 
Integrity Investigation is perhaps the most prominent organization dedicated to 
comparing the political corruption among the 50 American states. In many ways, it 
mimics a few well known global nongovernmental organizations such as Transparency 
International, Amnesty International, and the United Nations’ Human Development 
Programme’s Human Security Unit. Each of these organizations takes certain key criteria 
in their model for understanding corruption, safety, and human security and assigns a 
score or grade based upon this information. The State Integrity Investigation does the 
same, evaluating each of the United States and assigning a score.  See table 3-1 for State 
Integrity Investigation’s explanation (State Integrity Investigation, n.d.) for its chosen 
criteria.  
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Table 3.1, State Integrity Investigation - Investigation Categories 
State Integrity Investigation 
Criterion 
State Integrity Investigation’s Explanation 
Access to Information “What information is legally accessible in each state, and how 
easily can citizens get it?” 
Campaign Finance “The financing of electoral campaigns at the federal, state, and 
local levels.” 
Executive Accountability “Guidelines, laws, and procedures to ensure that governors and 
cabinet-level officials can be held accountable for their 
actions.” 
Legislative Accountability “Laws, policies, and procedures to ensure that lawmakers – 
who often work part-time and hold outside positions – best serve 
their constituencies and not their own personal political 
interests.” 
Judicial Accountability “How accountable and transparent are judicial officials and 
their staffs?” 
State Budgeting “Is the state budget process open to the public or conducted 
behind closed doors?” 
Civil Service Management “State hiring and firing regulations, nepotism, and cronyism 
rules, whistleblower protections, and other guidelines designed 
to ensure a competitive, safe, and professional work 
environment for its employees.” 
Procurement “State laws governing the purchase of goods and services.” 
Internal Auditing “State level internal auditing designed to add value and improve 
state government operations.” 
Lobbying Disclosure “Laws and practices that define what lobbyists can do as they 
attempt to influence government actions.” 
Pension Fund Management “Most states provide a defined pension plan that promises state 
workers a specific annual payment once they retire from service. 
Each state with a pension fund has policies governing state 
contributions.” 
Ethics Enforcement “Forty-one states require external oversight of their procedures 
through an Ethics Commission. An Ethics Commission is a 
committee tasked with validating the ethical grounds of the state 
government’s decisions.” 
Insurance Commissions “States regulate the insurance industry to protect consumers. 
Regulatory structures vary – the state may appoint a 
commission or elect a single commissioner, for example – but 
the overall mandate remains the same.” 
Redistricting “Following each U.S. census, states redraw the boundaries for 
congressional and legislative districts.” 
(State Integrity Investigation, n.d.) 
 
Based upon these criteria, the State Integrity Investigation issued this ranking of each 
state from most to least corrupt (State Integrity Investigation, 2012): 
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Table 3.2, State Integrity Investigation Rankings 
!"#"$% &#'()'*%
Georgia 1 
South Dakota 2 
Wyoming 3 
Virginia 4 
Maine 5 
South Carolina 6 
Michigan 7 
North Dakota 8 
Nevada 9 
Idaho 10 
Maryland 11 
New Mexico 12 
Oklahoma 13 
New York 14 
Utah 15 
New Hampshire 16 
Ohio 17 
Colorado 18 
Alaska 19 
Montana 20 
Arizona 21 
West Virginia 22 
Arkansas 23 
Texas 24 
Vermont 25 
Minesota 26 
Wisconsin 27 
Indiana 28 
Delaware 29 
North Carolina 30 
Pennsylvania 31 
Kentucky 32 
Florida 33 
Alabama 34 
Missouri 35 
Louisiana 36 
Oregon 37 
Hawaii 38 
Massachusetts 39 
Illinois 40 
Kansas 41 
Rhode Island 42 
Tennessee 43 
Iowa 44 
Mississippi 45 
Nebraska 46 
California 47 
Washington 48 
Connecticut 49 
New Jersey 50 
(State Integrity Investigation, 2012) 
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Law and Order: Total and Per Capita Corruption Convictions - The Public 
Integrity Section of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Criminal Division compiles and 
maintains information related to arrests and convictions of public officials. The total 
number of convictions for corruption-related offenses from 1998 – 2007 was compiled in 
a 2007 report to Congress (U.S. Department of Justice, 2007) and an article that appeared 
in The New York Times (Marsh, 2008, WK3). Convictions were divided by state. The 
states were subsequently ranked based upon which state had the highest number of guilty 
officials.  
Table 3.3, Total Number of Federal Corruption Convictions by State 
Rank State Convictions 1998 – 2007 
1 Florida 824 
2 New York 704 
3 Texas 565 
4 Pennsylvania 555 
5 (Tied) California 547 
5 (Tied) Ohio 547 
7 Illinois 502 
8 New Jersey 418 
9 Louisiana 380 
10 Virginia 332 
11 Alabama 303 
12 Tennessee 252 
13 Kentucky 242 
14 Michigan 215 
15 Mississippi 212 
16 Massachusetts 188 
17 North Carolina 179 
18 Georgia 163 
19 Missouri 158 
20 Maryland 148 
21 Arizona 140 
22 Indiana 123 
23 Wisconsin 122 
24 Connecticut 111 
25 Oklahoma 107 
26 Washington 99 
 35!
Table 3.3 (Continued) 
27 Arkansas 80 
28 Colorado 77 
29 West Virginia 74 
30 South Carolina 73 
31 Minnesota 66 
32 Montana 59 
33 North Dakota 53 
34 (Tied) Alaska 51 
34 (Tied) Hawaii 51 
36 Nevada 46 
37 Delaware 44 
38 South Dakota 41 
39 (Tied) Idaho 38 
39 (Tied) Kansas 38 
39 (Tied) Utah 38 
42 Oregon 36 
43 Iowa 35 
44 New Mexico 30 
45 Rhode Island 26 
46 Maine 25 
47 (Tied) New Hampshire 14 
47 (Tied) Wyoming 14 
49 Vermont 13 
50 Nebraska 12 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2007) 
 
Topping the list with 824 convictions between 1998 and 2007 was Florida. Next 
was New York with 704 for the same time period with Texas and Pennsylvania a distant 
third and fourth with 565 and 555 convictions respectively. By this measure, Florida was 
the most politically corrupt state in the United States for this time period. Conversely, the 
state with the lowest number of convictions was Nebraska with 12 followed by Vermont 
in 49th place with 13, and Wyoming and New Hampshire tied for 47th least corrupt with 
14 convictions each (U.S. Department of Justice, 2007). 
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These rankings aside, the nature of the crimes of which these public officials and 
others involved with corrupt activities were convicted requires illumination. If the Florida 
Citrus Commission could bravely declare that orange juice “isn’t just for breakfast, 
anymore” (Stoneback, 1984), a fitting slogan for political corruption would be that it’s 
not just bribery anymore. A common conception of political corruption is the bribe: a 
simple payment for a quid pro quo from an official. The fact of the matter is that political 
corruption, particularly in a developed nation, is a sophisticated enterprise consisting of a 
wide variety of crimes of which few citizens could conceive. In its 2007 report, the 
Public Integrity Section highlights a wide variety of offenses – including many that are 
simply beyond the scope and jurisdiction of Florida’s statutes. Because these convictions 
could include interstate and international offenses carried out by people who were 
convicted of crimes within a particular state, violations of federal elections laws, and 
issues where the U.S. Attorney is the prosecutor with primary jurisdiction, it is an 
imprecise measure of corruption within any particular state. For these reasons, it is even 
more important to consider this measure in conjunction with other state rankings for 
political corruption.  
 
Returning once again to rankings based upon convictions for corruption offenses 
we are reminded that not all offenses are created equal nor does one conviction 
necessarily equal another when ranking states. In order to standardize this data, it is 
necessary to evaluate the total number offenses on a per capita basis. When considering 
offenses on a per capita basis (Marsh, 2008, WK3), the “most” and “least” corrupt states 
are radically different.  
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Table 3.4, Per Capita Number of Federal Corruption Convictions by State 
Rank State Annual Convictions Per 1 Mil Residents 
1 North Dakota 8.3 
2 Alaska 7.9 
3 Louisiana 7.5 
4 Mississippi 7.4 
5 Montana 6.4 
6 Kentucky 5.9 
7 Alabama 5.6 
8 (Tied) Delaware 5.4 
8 (Tied) South Dakota 5.4 
10 (Tied) Florida 4.9 
10 (Tied) New Jersey 4.9 
12 Ohio 4.8 
13 Pennsylvania 4.2 
14 (Tied) Tennessee 4.2 
14 (Tied) Virginia 4.2 
16 (Tied) Hawaii 4.1 
16 (Tied) West Virginia 4.1 
18 Illinois 4.0 
19 New York 3.7 
20 Connecticut 3.2 
21 Oklahoma 3.1 
22 (Tied) Arkansas 3.0 
22 (Tied) Massachusetts 3.0 
24 (Tied) Wyoming 2.8 
24 (Tied) Idaho 2.8 
24 (Tied) Missouri 2.8 
27 Maryland 2.7 
28 Texas 2.6 
29 (Tied) Arizona 2.5 
29 (Tied) Rhode Island 2.5 
31 Wisconsin 2.2 
32 (Tied) North Carolina 2.1 
32 (Tied) Michigan 2.1 
32 (Tied) Vermont 2.1 
32 (Tied) Nevada 2.1 
36 Indiana 2.0 
37 (Tied) Maine 1.9 
37 (Tied) Georgia 1.9 
39 South Carolina 1.8 
40 Colorado 1.7 
41 (Tied) Washington 1.6 
41 (Tied) New Mexico 1.6 
41 (Tied) Utah 1.6 
41 (Tied) California 1.6 
45 Kansas 1.4 
46 Minnesota 1.3 
47 Iowa 1.2 
48 New Hampshire 1.1 
49 Oregon 1.0 
50 Nebraska 0.7 
(Marsh, 2008, WJ3) 
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As discussed in The New York Times article covering these rankings (Marsh, 2008, 
WK3), the per capita approach is especially negative for North Dakota’s image. North 
Dakota’s image notwithstanding, the radically different results further underscore 
operationalization concerns within corruption research and shows that not all per capita 
conviction rates are created equal. 
 
It’s the Perception: Results from a Survey of State Reporters - In 2003, State 
Politics & Policy Quarterly published the results of a survey of state government reports 
conducted with the goal of gaining information about the perceived corruption in each of 
the 50 states (Boylan & Long, 2003). From an epistemological perspective, a survey of 
those who cover state politics to determine a relative perception of political corruption 
seems a logical approach to the issue. The results of this survey identified Rhode Island, 
Louisiana, and New Mexico as the top three most corrupt states and Colorado, North 
Dakota, and South Dakota tied for least corrupt.  
 
Table 3.5, Boylan & Long (2003) Survey of Journalists 
Rank State Reporters’ Scores 
(Out of 7) 
1 Rhode Island 5.500 
2 Louisiana 5.400 
3 New Mexico 5.333 
4 Oklahoma 5.000 
4 Delaware 5.000 
6 Alabama 4.909 
7 Kentucky 4.857 
8 Arizona 4.714 
8 West Virginia 4.714 
10 Illinois 4.667 
10 Ohio 4.667 
12 Connecticut 4.500 
13 Pennsylvania 4.455 
14 Utah 4.333 
15 Maryland 4.052 
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
16 Hawaii 4.000 
16 Indiana 4.000 
16 Mississippi 4.000 
16 New York 4.000 
20 Missouri 3.692 
21 Arkansas 3.667 
22 Georgia 3.500 
22 South Carolina 3.500 
22 Nevada 3.500 
22 Florida 3.500 
26 North Carolina 3.471 
27 California 3.333 
28 Tennessee 3.250 
29 Texas 3.000 
29 Alaska 3.000 
29 Wyoming 3.000 
29 Washington 3.000 
33 Michigan 2.958 
34 Virginia 2.667 
34 Nebraska 2.667 
36 Wisconsin 2.600 
37 Idaho 2.500 
38 Kansas 2.429 
39 Iowa 2.250 
40 Montana 2.143 
41 Minnesota 2.000 
41 Vermont 2.000 
41 Oregon 2.000 
44 Maine 1.667 
45 Colorado 1.500 
45 South Dakota 1.500 
45 North Dakota 1.500 
(Boylan & Long, 2003) 
 
The survey is a natural response to the concern that corruption is an untraceable 
(Belinsky, 2009) behavior without a solid set of criteria. There also exists the possibility, 
known only to local journalists, that certain anti-corruption activities are in fact 
politically motivated methods for eliminating political competition (Duhamel, 2004). 
Additionally, local journalists may be the best source of information in cities with a 
heavily entrenched power structure (Trounstine, 2008). However, a criticism of this 
approach – or the survey audience in particular, is the journalists’ close proximity to the 
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political actors about whom they are being surveyed. While journalists are nominally 
neutral in the process and expected to provide an unbiased response concerning relative 
corruption in their home state, they may not be as unbiased as one is led to believe 
(Foerstel, 2001). A notable example of a lack of journalistic neutrality was the decision of 
NewsMax, a publication with a Tallahassee reporter who could have been included in this 
corruption perception survey, to endorse and contribute $100,000.00 to the campaign of 
Florida Governor Rick Scott (R-FL) (Krepel, 2011). The idea of a news publication 
endorsing and working to elect a partisan candidate while simultaneously providing news 
coverage of the campaign potentially casts a chilling shadow over the validity of surveys 
involving political journalists.  
 
E Pluribus Unum: Consolidating Approaches, the Meta-Study  
 
Each model for ranking the states based on political corruption brings certain 
advantages and disadvantages. The State Integrity Investigation is overly focused on 
institutions and maintains an overt advocacy role in states in which it has a presence, 
measures and rankings of states based on total and per capita corruption convictions also 
fail to take into account population (in the case of total convictions) and externalities such 
as special investigations, enhanced enforcement, or other activities that may temporarily 
increase the number of corruption convictions (this applies to both the total and per capita 
rankings), while the journalist poll is subjective and based upon the perception of the 
reporters who responded. Taking these issues into consideration, it is logical to 
consolidate these rankings into a single ranking that takes into account all four 
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approaches to ranking states. Each of these studies covers concurrent time periods, cover 
all states (except for the journalist poll, which omits Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and 
New Jersey), and analyze the same subject along different lines. Averaging the results of 
all four studies, one can derive a more accurate reflection of corruption across all 50 
states. The strength of this approach is that it takes into consideration both the total and 
per capita conviction rates in all 50 states – effectively mitigating concerns over 
disproportionately high overall convictions and disproportionately low per capita rates. 
An averaged ranking also accounts for the anticorruption institutions analyzed by the 
State Integrity Investigation and the perceptions of the journalists’ poll. Based upon 
readily available data, an average ranking is possibly the most accurate reflection of 
comparative corruption among the 50 American states.  
 
Table 3.5, Averaged Rankings 
State Integrity 
Investigation 
Per Capita 
Convictions 
Total 
Convictions 
Journalists Total Average New 
Ranking 
Ohio 17 12 5 10 11 1 
Louisiana 36 3 9 2 12.5 2 
New York 14 19 2 16 12.75 3 
Kentucky 32 6 13 7 14.5 (Tied) 4 (Tied) 
Alabama 34 7 11 6 14.5 (Tied) 4 (Tied) 
Pennsylvania 31 13 4 13 15.25 6 
Virginia 4 14 10 34 15.5 7 
Oklahoma 13 21 25 4 15.75 8 
Florida 33 10 1 22 16.5 9 
Maryland 11 27 20 15 18.25 10 
West Virginia 22 16 29 8 18.75 (Tied) 11 (Tied) 
Illinois 40 18 7 10 18.75 (Tied) 11 (Tied) 
Delaware 29 8 37 4 19.5 (Tied) 13 (Tied) 
Georgia 1 37 18 22 19.5 (Tied) 13 (Tied) 
Arizona 21 29 21 8 19.75 15 
Mississippi 45 4 15 16 20 16 
Alaska 19 2 34 29 21 (Tied) 17 (Tied) 
Texas 24 28 3 29 21 (Tied) 17 (Tied) 
Michigan 7 32 14 33 21.5 19 
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
North Dakota 8 1 33 45 21.75 20 
New Jersey 50 10 8 N/A 22.66666667 21 
South Dakota 2 8 38 45 23.25 (Tied) 22 (Tied) 
Arkansas 23 22 27 21 23.25 (Tied) 22 (Tied) 
Montana 20 5 32 40 24.25 (Tied) 24 (Tied) 
Tennessee 43 14 12 28 24.25 (Tied) 24 (Tied) 
South Carolina 6 39 30 22 24.25 (Tied) 24 (Tied) 
Missouri 35 24 19 20 24.5 27 
Nevada 9 32 36 22 24.75 28 
New Mexico 12 41 44 3 25 29 
Indiana 28 36 22 16 25.5 30 
Massachusetts 39 22 16 N/A 25.66666667 31 
Wyoming 3 24 47 29 25.75 32 
Hawaii 38 16 34 16 26 33 
Connecticut 49 20 24 12 26.25 (Tied) 34 (Tied) 
North Carolina 30 32 17 26 26.25 (Tied) 34 (Tied) 
Utah 15 41 39 14 27.25 36 
Idaho 10 25 39 37 27.75 37 
Rhode Island 42 29 45 1 29.25 (Tied) 38 (Tied) 
Wisconsin 27 31 23 36 29.25 (Tied) 38 (Tied) 
California 47 41 5 27 30 40 
Colorado 18 40 28 45 32.75 41 
Maine 5 37 46 44 33 42 
Washington 48 41 26 29 36 (Tied) 43 (Tied) 
Minnesota 26 46 31 41 36 (Tied) 43 (Tied) 
Vermont 25 32 49 41 36.75 45 
New Hampshire 16 48 47 N/A 37 46 
Kansas 41 45 39 38 40.75 47 
Oregon 37 49 42 41 42.25 48 
Iowa 44 47 43 39 43.25 49 
Nebraska 46 50 50 34 45 50 
 
This approach of averaging the other four ranking models allows a researcher to control 
for disproportionately high total convictions, for population via the per capita ranking, for 
strong state anti-corruption institutions evaluated by the State Integrity Investigation, and 
for the perception of political journalists. All states are issued a respective rank – 1 being 
the most corrupt, 50 being the least corrupt, and sorted based upon their average rank. 
This approach identifies consistently high corruption indicators and comes with a new 
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“most corrupt” state, Ohio and stronger evidence of Nebraska being the perceived “least 
corrupt” state in the United States. But what does this mean? The approach of averaging a 
wide swatch of comparative corruption indicators shows not only do states need to 
further prioritize political corruption as a public policy issue, but also that primarily 
qualitative data sources concerning corruption can produce a provable, precise measure 
of a state’s level of corruption relative to the other states. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - CORRUPTION IN FLORIDA 
 
 Statistical measures and surveys of perceived political corruption can only 
provide a limited view into a particular state. Gaining an insight into the cultural and 
political contexts of a particular state can enable researchers and reformers to target 
reforms that are not only beneficial, but also practical initiatives that stand a real chance 
of implementation. A rigorous, case-based analysis of a state can also reveal more 
information about the causes, motivations, and incentives of corrupt actors in a way 
unobtainable through quantitative measures and other indices (Andersson and Bergman, 
2009). Still another reason for an in-depth review of Florida’s experience with political 
corruption is the maturity of its democracy and well-established institutions. As a state in 
the lone remaining superpower in the world, Florida occupies a position of democracy 
and development to which many nations strive. Since Florida still grapples with questions 
of real and perceived political corruption, the exploration of successful strategies here are 
just as important as they might be in one of the more corrupt nations. Finally, analyzing a 
single subdivision of a state (i.e. Florida) allows researchers to review instances of 
corruption in a way not available to strict comparative researchers and work to better 
understand the relationship between economic growth and political corruption, 
particularly the question of whether corruption reduces growth or if growth reduces 
corruption (Brown and Shackman, 2007). 
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There are several internal and external approaches to implementing reform within 
a state, but none are possible without a deep perspective of the landscape. Among the 
many considerations for reformers is to what extent heretofore corrupt actors will be 
included in a new system, who will become part of a reform-based coalition, and what, if 
any, aspects of the former system should be preserved (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). To this 
end, we will be discussing Florida’s current approach to political corruption in its laws. 
Then, assuming the perspective of an international nongovernmental organization, we 
will analyze Florida’s anti-corruption institutions within Transparency International’s 
National Integrity System (2000) model. By delving deeper into Florida’s perspective on 
this issue, we apply the lessons of definition and operationalization of political corruption 
and anti-corruption approaches to existing institutions.  
 
Statutes Chapter 838 – Criminalized Corruption 
 
A fundamental premise of the American system of democracy is the notion that 
the elected official is elected from among the people and acts in their best interests as the 
representative of the people. The trust placed on the person elected to hold office, to vote 
on how tax dollars are spent, to set the priorities of the government is a burden that 
should be stressed and remain foremost in the minds of elected officials. However, this is 
often not the case and elected officials will act in their own self-interest and the interests 
of those family, friends, and other supporters – often to the detriment of those for whom 
they were elected to serve. While Florida has glaringly obvious weaknesses with regard 
to laws making corrupt behavior illegal, it also has strong institutions created in response 
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to specific scandals that serve as a strong counter to actors who may wish to pursue their 
own agenda. However, it is significant to note that much of the perceived corruption in 
the American democratic system is related to the improper influence of money in politics. 
Described as an “influence market,” politicians within this system accept legal campaign 
contributions with the contributor buying access rather than a specific vote or outcome 
(Johnston, 2005). Florida fits into this category, as we will see from the case of former 
Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, Ray Sansom.  
 
Concerns over the issue of political corruption in Florida come up on a regular 
basis and have been examined at great length by the government itself. We will discuss 
two such governmental studies: the 1999 report by the Public Corruption Study 
Commission requested by former Governor Jeb Bush and the report of the Nineteenth 
Statewide Grand Jury convened in 2010 at the request of then Governor Charlie Crist. 
The Public Corruption Study Commission was made up of fifteen elected and appointed 
officials along with members of concerned entities such as the Florida Commission on 
Ethics and other political organizations (Public Corruption Study Commission, 1999). 
Taken together, these two state reports clearly outline the problem of political corruption 
in Florida, propose solutions to this problem, and do so in a clear, concise manner.  
 
 This line of thought leads us to wonder: just what are Florida’s anti-corruption 
laws? Pursuant to Florida State Statutes, Title XLVI, Chapter 838 relates to criminalized 
political corruption. In Florida, the only criminalized political behaviors are related to 
bribery or improperly influencing of a public servant for personal gain (whether the 
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offender is a public servant receiving this benefit or the person attempting to influence 
said public servant). The question of just what constitutes a public servant is defined in 
Florida Statute 838.014(6) (2012) thusly: 
(6) “Public servant” means: 
(a) Any officer or employee of a state, county, municipal, or special 
district agency or entity; 
(b) Any legislative or judicial officer or employee; 
(c) Any person, except a witness, who acts as a general or special 
magistrate, receiver, auditor, arbitrator, umpire, referee, consultant, 
or hearing officer while performing a governmental function; or 
(d) A candidate for election or appointment to any of the positions listed 
in this subsection, or an individual who has been elected to, but has 
yet to officially assume the responsibilities of, public office. 
 
The definition we find in today’s Florida Statutes is not without controversy. The 2010 
Statewide Grand Jury Study on Corruption recommended that this definition be far 
broader, suggesting these changes: 
a.   Amend F.S. 838.014(6)(a) to read: “Any officer or employee of a 
governmental entity.”  
 b.  Create F.S. 838.014(6)(e) to state:  
 “Any officer, director, partner, manager, representative, or employee of a 
nongovernmental entity, private corporation, quasi-public corporation, 
quasi-public entity or anyone covered under chapter 119 that is authorized 
by law or contract to perform a governmental function or provide a 
governmental service on behalf of the state, county, municipal, or special 
district agency or entity to the extent that the individual’s conduct relates 
to the performance of the governmental function or provision of the 
governmental service.”  
 
“‘Governmental function’ or ‘governmental service’ for purposes of 
Chapter 838 means performing a function or serving a governmental 
purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate 
governmental unit or which is demonstrated to perform a function or serve 
a purpose which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of 
public funds.”   
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The explanation for these changes is that the current definition of a public servant has not 
kept pace with the nature of the offenses for which the statute was written. The 2010 
Grand Jury Report (p. 19-22) goes so far as the provide the examples of a private 
company providing a government service that was contracted by a nonprofit corporation 
that directly receives federal, state, and local tax dollars to execute its services. In the 
example, officers of the private company rigged bids, accepted bribes, and engaged in 
nepotism. However, the offenders could not be charged under Florida’s corruption statute 
because they were not considered public servants under the statute because the law does 
not apply to any person not directly employed by a governmental entity. This concern 
was echoed in several other examples provided by the Grand Jury’s report: employees of 
nonprofit corporations contracted by the state falsifying community service hours for 
felons on probation, the ability of prisoners to bribe guards at privatized state prisons 
because the guards are not “technically” government employees, and bribing contracted 
home inspectors to find a house up to code in advance of a sale. Taken all together, there 
are glaringly wide-open loopholes in what constituted bribery under Florida’s state laws. 
For this reason, redefining the definition of public servant was the “first and most critical 
recommendation” of the Grand Jury (Nineteenth Statewide Grand Jury Report, 2010, p. 
17). The Grand Jury also recommends another simple change to Chapter 838 in which the 
concept of acting “with corrupt intent” is replaced with “intentionally” (p. 23). This 
would allow prosecutors a lower legal threshold for establishing that a public servant 
intentionally acted to misuse their office. The members of the Grand Jury believe that 
these actions would result in easier prosecution of crimes that would meet a layperson’s 
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interpretation of political corruption – crimes that cannot currently be prosecuted under 
the current statute as it is written.  
 
Insofar as the state level consequences of corrupt behaviors, all offenses in the 
corruption statute are considered third degree felonies, with the exception of bribery, 
which is a second degree felony. As such, the maximum punishment for a first time 
offender convicted of a single third degree felony in Florida is “a term of imprisonment 
not exceeding 5 years,” a fine not to exceed $5,000.00 (Florida Statutes 775.082(d), 2012 
and 775.083(1)(c), 2012). This is a seemingly harsh punishment fitting a simple crime, 
but one should take into consideration another of Florida’s criminal penalties, Statute 
775.087 or the 10-20-Life law – the possession of a handgun during the commission of a 
violent felony. A fundamental premise of the 10-20-Life mandatory minimum sentences 
is the common notion that a penalty for a crime can be so severe that it serves as a 
deterrent to commit a crime. This line of reasoning can be found with the use of the death 
penalty as a punishment for certain sexual assaults and drug traffickers. The same 
justification appears in the recommendations of the 1999 Florida Public Corruption Study 
Commission Report and the 2010 Statewide Grand Jury Report on Corruption when both 
bodies urged the Governor and State Legislature to amend the corruption statute to make 
all offenses related to the misuse of public office a second degree felony – thus increasing 
the minimum length of prison sentences from five to fifteen years and doubling the 
maximum fine from $5,000.00 to $10,000.00.  
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 To summarize the effectiveness of Florida’s criminal laws against public 
corruption, it can be widely assumed that they are not effective for a wide swath of 
corruption actions. This is particularly true when there is a privatized corporation 
involved in the performance of a government function (such as a privatized state prison), 
as employees and those controlling these enterprises are not considered public servants 
under the law. Such is the case: they are largely exempt from the corruption statute by 
virtue of the statute’s outdated definitions. This is not to say that a person defrauding the 
state government is not simply exempt from any negative consequences of their corrupt 
enterprises, but rather that the state cannot refer to the crimes as political corruption. A 
person who defrauds the state can be charged with a wide range of crimes such as theft, 
fraud, or racketeering – thus rendering crimes against the state and its citizens as being no 
different from a crime against another corporation and its stockholders. Corrupt actors are 
also subject to federal laws and prosecution – which cover a far wider scope of offenses 
than state laws. Federal prosecutors are capable of prosecuting crimes that cross state and 
national boundaries, exceed the scope of state laws, and involve federal officials. Federal 
elected officials such as members of the House of Representatives and Senators are 
subject to federal jurisdiction and also to Congressional Ethics Committees, which are 
empowered to remove them from office.  
 
Florida Statutes Chapter 112, Part III – The Code of Ethics 
 
 Florida State Statutes Chapter 112, Part III is also known as the Florida Code of 
Ethics for Public Officers and Employees. The Code of Ethics provides information to 
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Florida’s public servants about their duties and obligations to disclose certain information 
and also what actions are prohibited once they accept a position as a public servant in the 
state. The enforcement body for the Code of Ethics is the Florida Commission on Ethics 
– an administrative enforcement body composed of nine commissioners appointed to 
two-year terms. The Governor appoints five commissioners with the remaining four 
commissioners appointed by the Senate President and the Speaker of the Florida House 
of Representatives. Furthermore, not more than five of the nine members of the 
commission can belong to the same political party. The Commission on Ethics was 
created in 1974 with the passage of the Florida Government in the Sunshine Amendment, 
which also replaced the criminal enforcement of the offenses shown in the Code of Ethics 
with the administrative enforcement of the Commission on Ethics. Additionally, the 
Commission does not have the authority to unilaterally launch an investigation of 
suspected political corruption, instead relying on citizen complaints before being 
permitted to take any action (Commission on Ethics, 2013). The Code of Ethics itself is 
primarily concerned with outlining prohibited solicitation of compensation from public 
servants, lobbying rules, and misuse of one’s public position. It also includes the 
requirement for regular disclosure of conflicts of interest and financial disclosures – 
which are also maintained by the Commission on Ethics (Commission on Ethics, 2013). 
 
Florida Evaluated Through the National Integrity System Lens 
 
 Beyond state statutes, Florida has other institutions and safeguards dedicated to 
combating public corruption, or at least perform a mission associated with this goal. 
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Speaking generally, Florida’s political reform efforts have been a direct response to 
scandals or serious threats to an existing status quo – whether judicial corruption 
(Dyckman, 2008), a response to racial strife (Warren, 2008), a reapportionment crisis 
(Karl, 2010, p. 143-146), or widespread demographic and partisan shifts (Colburn, 2007). 
There are many checks and balances within Florida’s government that prevent or at least 
deter corruption. To analyze these checks and balances within Florida’s institutions, we 
will be using Transparency International’s National Integrity System to determine how 
Florida fares when held up to an ‘ideal’ institution-based state model typically used to 
rank nations. We will also review some updates that may be appropriate to the National 
Integrity System when using it, or a similar model, for analyzing political subdivisions 
within a country (i.e. each state in the United States).  
 
 One can easily see that these common sense institutional reforms could result in a 
lower level of political corruption and can be applied to any state. To this end, we have 
applied this model to Florida’s political institutions. In our examination of Florida’s 
political system, one will see that Transparency International’s National Integrity System 
model may be lacking in several key areas. Despite having established strong institutions 
reflective of those in Transparency International’s National Integrity System model, 
Florida is a state dominated by single-party rule in which instances of political corruption 
and influence peddling are quite frequent. In the National Integrity System model 
provided by Transparency International, it is quite apparent that the model is designed to 
benefit every country wishing to further strengthen its defenses against political 
corruption and to make corruption a “high risk, low reward” enterprise (Transparency 
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International, 2000). As a state within a superpower, it is logical to apply this model to 
Florida in order to test the hypothesis that they will be successful as a nation develops.  
  
 On its face, Florida is an excellent test subject for this model as it meets or exceeds 
all of the pillars established by National Integrity System, has strong institutions, and a 
high quality of life (as compared to many other countries). In this analysis, we will look 
at how each of Florida’s institutions fits within the National Integrity System model 
beginning with the executive branch of Florida’s government, the state’s governor. In the 
TI Sourcebook 2000, the key facets of executive branch reforms include placing an 
emphasis on the leadership of the individual executive, a detached relationship with the 
state’s judiciary, the need to simultaneously lead the civil service without exerting 
excessive political influence upon it, the personal gifts and legal privileges afforded to the 
executive, and the role of the executive in preparing the state’s budget (Transparency 
International, 2000). 
  
 Keeping these factors in mind, the first pillar in the National Integrity System (the 
executive), the governor of Florida’s office meets these requirements with few notable 
exceptions. Over time, the ‘bully pulpit’ of executive leaders within the United States has 
only grown and there is much emphasis placed on the opinions and statements of 
executive political leaders. This phenomenon is hardly new as there is an extensive 
record of aggressive executive leadership from Florida’s governors. Examples include 
former Governor LeRoy Collins speaking out against desegregation and participating in 
the Selma, Alabama march as a representative of the federal government (Dyckman, 
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2006). Another example is former Governor Reubin O’D. Askew successfully leading a 
statewide referendum to implement a corporate income tax for Florida (Dyckman, 2011). 
Florida has a long history of listening when its governor endorses and campaigns for a 
particular initiative. Continuing on, the governor’s relationship with the judiciary is 
limited only to the appointment of judges who have been approved by the Florida Bar 
Association’s nonpartisan Judicial Nominating Commission that solicits potential 
nominees, weighs their qualifications, and presents a list of between three and six names 
to the governor (Statutes & Constitution, 1998). After nominations have been made, the 
new Supreme Court of Florida or District Court of Appeals justice is subject to a 
quadrennial retention vote. Insofar as the governor’s relationship with the state’s civil 
service, the state’s bureaucracy is operated under a strong cabinet system (The Governor 
and Cabinet, 2010) composed of the Governor (who serves as chairman), the state’s 
Attorney General, Chief Financial Officer, and the Commissioner of Agriculture and 
Consumer Services (The Governor and Cabinet, 2010). All of these officials are 
independently elected and have a vote equal to that of the governor with the exception of 
the governor’s ability to cast a tie-breaking vote (The Governor and Cabinet, 2010). 
Given this arrangement, the governor of Florida has significantly less influence over the 
state’s bureaucracy than many other similarly situated elected officials in the United 
States and elsewhere. Taking into consideration the governor’s limited relationship with 
the state’s judiciary including a merit-based nomination system and a power-sharing 
arrangement with the state’s bureaucracy, one could argue that Florida exceeds the 
suggested institutional checks on a state’s executive found in the National Integrity 
System.   
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 The second pillar in the National Integrity System is the legislative branch of 
government. The TI Sourcebook provides a number of indicators for evaluating the 
effectiveness of the legislative branch as a pillar within the National integrity System 
with the overarching theme of the legislative branch serving as an effective check against 
the power of the executive, conflict of interest laws, separation of the legislative and 
judicial branches, concerns about the fairness of elections, and finally the legislatures role 
as an equal in the state’s budgetary processes (Transparency International, 2000). In a 
general sense, the answer to whether or not Florida has strict laws against conflicts of 
interest and personal gain of elected officials is a resounding yes. Using one’s position as 
an elected official for direct personal gain while in office (personal enrichment, a higher-
paying job, etc) is seen as serious breach of ethics and applicable federal laws. However, 
there are many openings for behaviors that, while not illegal, can be perceived as 
conflicts of interest. For example, while in office, former Speaker of the Florida House of 
Representatives Ray Sansom has been indicted on charges of using his office for personal 
gain (Leary, 2009). This action resulted in his resignation from the top leadership 
position in the Florida House of Representatives under the immediate threat of removal 
by members of his own political party and his subsequent resignation from the Florida 
House prior to the beginning of his trial (Leary, 2010). Ultimately the charges were 
dropped with no criminal consequences for Sansom, which further underscores the need 
for stronger conflict of interest laws in Florida. 
 
 On the issues related to political campaigns, the Florida Legislature meets or 
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exceeds all of the requirements placed upon it by the National Integrity System. Florida 
has fair, democratic elections, the Florida Elections Commission monitors campaign and 
political party contributions and expenditures, and the media typically exposes those 
involved with improper fundraising activities. An issue on which the TI Sourcebook is 
silent is the matter of political gerrymandering. Florida has a long history of using the 
reapportionment process to preserve existing power structures (Colburn, 2007). Districts 
for the Florida State Senate and the Florida House of Representatives are deliberately 
designed to benefit the party in control of the state, in this case the Republican Party 
(FairDistrictsFlorida.org, n.d.) (Wagner and Prier, 2008). Through the creation of a 
number of “majority minority” (Dye, et al., 2008) districts that support the election of a 
member of an ethnic minority in the name of providing additional advantages to 
minorities within Florida, the Republican Party has been able to build districts so 
favorable to Republican incumbents as to result in their controlling greater than two-
thirds of each house of the legislature. This has been done despite the opposition 
Democratic Party’s voter registration advantage of more than 560,000 registered voters in 
Florida (NVRA Monthly Report Statistics, 2013). Given the extreme nature of 
gerrymandering in Florida and the security of the Republican Party’s supermajority in 
Florida, a requirement for equitable apportionment of legislative districts should be added 
to the National Integrity System. In 2010, the voters of Florida amended the state 
constitution to include two provisions requiring that legislative and congressional districts 
be drawn in such a manner as to be “compact, contiguous, and support no political party 
over another” (FairDistrictsFlorida.org, n.d.). While the implementation of these 
measures affected some change in the make-up to Florida’s legislature, it did not affect 
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the Republican majority in the House of Representatives.  After the 2012 election, it was 
seen as an initiative designed to benefit Democratic Party candidates rather than a 
candidate reflective of an individual district (Associated Press, 2012). 
 
 The third pillar in the National Integrity System is the Public Accounts Committee 
of the legislature. Essentially, this would function as an appropriations committee that 
would evaluate the budget presented by the executive. Transparency International 
suggests that it is a fundamental check on the power of the executive to require the 
legislature to review and approve the state’s budget. Florida’s governmental system 
requires this, but also provides for an executive check on the appropriations made by the 
legislature. Through the use of the line-item veto, the governor is able to provide 
oversight for items placed in the budget by the legislature as opposed to those items 
proposed by the governor. A line-item veto can be overridden by the legislature, but it 
would require a two-thirds majority vote, as would any other piece of legislation subject 
to a veto. This illustrates another check on legislative power that is not mentioned in the 
National Integrity System. Though, the model does suggest that the chair of the public 
accounts committee be a member of the opposition political party or be somebody who is 
particularly fair-minded (Transparency International, 2000). Placing a member of the 
opposition party as chairperson of the state’s budget committees would indeed be an 
intriguing concept to observe and could reduce the amount of frivolous appropriations. 
  
 The fourth pillar is that of the auditor-general. This is an entity responsible for 
monitoring the use of public monies, that the executive follows the will of the legislature, 
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and that all measures are taken to ensure that government operates efficiently. The office 
would also be responsible for ensuring that the government uses “financial and auditing 
procedures designed effectively to reduce the incidence of corruption and increase the 
likelihood of its detection” (Transparency International, 2000). Florida’s government 
does not have an independent agency solely dedicated to this mission, but there are 
several entities that accomplish the same mission intended by the National Integrity 
System. While a partisan elected official, the state’s Chief Financial Officer oversees the 
state’s Department of Management Services, which provides purchasing and human 
resources support to the rest of state government and also audits other state agencies and 
projects. As we have seen with the recent “Taj Mahal” courthouse scandal, (Morgan, 
2010) the Department of Management Services can be inappropriately influenced by 
other political entities, in this case judges and legislative staffers. Though the 
inappropriate appropriation happened in 2007, this scandal did not come to light until a 
media exposé was published in 2010. This illustrates an area in which the political system 
in Florida is lacking potential oversight.   
  
 The fifth pillar of the National Integrity System is the public service. Transparency 
International (2000) states that civil service should recognize “the accountability of civil 
servants to the Minister; the duty of all public officers to discharge public functions 
reasonably and according to the law; the duty to comply with the law, including 
international law and treaty obligations, and to uphold the administration of justice, and 
ethical standards governing particular professions.”   Florida’s state employees are rarely 
shown to have been corrupt or to have participated in corrupt behavior. The fact that all 
of Florida’s public employees are required to disclose all work products and all 
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documents under the state’s aggressive “Sunshine Law” has served as a very effective 
deterrent to public corruption among civil servants – it may be a very different situation 
among elected officials and their immediate staffs. This is particularly true when a 
member of the general public or media can request access to every e-mail or phone 
record for a public employee (My Florida Sunshine, n.d.). Florida’s expansive Sunshine 
Law is another example of the National Integrity System coming up short. Another pillar 
dictates that investigative journalism needs to be an essential aspect of a free media, but 
only makes passing mention that the government should be required to make available all 
possible information to aid in these efforts. In instances of classified or military 
documents, the National Integrity System could also suggest a streamlined 
declassification process based upon the length of time since the document was first 
prepared or classified. While Florida’s government does not have an extensive amount of 
top-secret information, it is still important to note that the model should include 
awareness of the usefulness of classified documents in providing governmental oversight. 
This is especially true in instances of a government participating in or leading clandestine 
military or paramilitary operations.  
  
 
 The sixth pillar is perhaps one of the most important and often-discussed aspects of 
combating political corruption: the judiciary (Transparency International, 2000). While 
there is an abundant discussion about the judiciary in the National Integrity System, this 
boils down to only a few key points. The judiciary must effectively serve as a check 
against the power of the executive and legislative branches without fear of repercussions, 
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it must function as an efficient institution capable of providing fair legal services to the 
population in a timely fashion, and citizens must be able to address judicial misconduct 
through an institution other than the formal court system. On these issues, Florida’s court 
system adequately meets the National Integrity System standard, but it goes well and 
above it in ensuring that judicial nominations at the Supreme Court and District Courts of 
Appeal levels are based entirely upon the merit of the nominee through the Judicial 
Nominating Commission process and also that potential nominees meet a set of basic 
requirements. These policies arose from a long line of judicial scandals in Florida 
including a justice who ruled in favor of his former law firm (Dyckman, 2008), a judge 
resigning abruptly after being filmed on a high-dollar junket to Las Vegas, and a judge 
flushing legal documents down his office toilet. Judges in Florida used to also be elected 
on a popular partisan basis and this opened the door for judges to behave inappropriately 
to reward campaign contributors (Dyckman, 2008). A caution against popular elections 
for judicial figures is also an item that fails to appear in the TI Sourcebook. Another item 
that is of importance in the TI Sourcebook is the accountability of prosecutors and their 
responses to political influence. Transparency International suggests that prosecutors be 
subject to a standardized set of published guidelines and also make a determination on 
whether or not they should investigate without regard for political influence or 
connections on the part of the accused. While Transparency International does make 
mention of the need for fair prosecutors, it fails to account for the need for skilled, 
capable public defenders. The right of an accused person to be represented at no or low 
cost by a qualified attorney is a fundamental right for the citizen of any free and 
transparent society and one which Florida provides to its citizens. This underscores yet 
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another point in which the National Integrity System is inadequate to its goal of reducing 
or eliminating corruption in more developed nations. It would also be worthwhile to 
specify that the judiciary have the power of judicial review over the laws and executive 
orders of the executive authority within a state.  
 
 The seventh pillar of the National Integrity System to be applied to Florida’s 
government is a free and independent media. Transparency International (2000) devotes 
considerable time to arguing that the media should not be government-owned nor should 
it be government-controlled. They also argue that corporate ownership for the media is a 
positive attribute of free societies as long as there is competition between corporate-
owned media outlets. The National Integrity System actually only places priority on the 
ability of the media to function without government interference, for competition to exist 
between privately-owned media interests, and for a society to support a living wage for 
journalists and a means through which journalists can be educated in their craft. Trends in 
corporate ownership seem to have damaged transparency and oversight in government 
substantially more than they have helped. Some of the most in-depth reporting in Florida 
is the result of research conducted by non-profit media entities such as public television 
and reports from National Public Radio. In fact, the State Integrity Investigation is a 
nonprofit entity supported by groups like Public Radio International (State Integrity 
Investigation, n.d.). Entities such as these represent a far more independent media 
presence than either state-owned or corporate-owned media outlets. One of the best-
known papers in Florida, the former St. Petersburg Times (now the Tampa Bay Times), is 
actually owned by a nonprofit organization, the St. Petersburg Times Fund, Inc. (Tampa 
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Bay Times, n.d.). Because non-profit organizations can devote more time and energy to 
ensuring a high level of ethics within their ranks without concern for profit-making 
enterprises and because they regularly provide a far higher quality news product, 
Transparency International should include the need for an independent, non-profit media 
estate in its National Integrity Plan. At the very least, it could follow the Florida model 
and have a hybrid between corporate-owned and non-profit media organizations reporting 
on the state’s government or the British model of government-supported media and 
privately owned media coexisting.  
  
 The eighth pillar in this system is related to civil society. Transparency 
International (2000) defines civil society as all actors within a political system that are 
not governmental in nature nor are they business interests. Examples discussed include 
chambers of commerce, nongovernmental organizations, sports clubs, and other informal 
groups of citizens. It does not include the actor on an individual level. What this pillar 
comes down to is the need for members of society to be able to organize without 
excessive governmental interference. Also discussed is the need for a standardized 
procedure for the licensure of professionals such as accountants, attorneys, and medical 
professionals. In Florida, citizens have the right to peaceably assemble and to incorporate 
a more formal organization should they wish. Florida also has an extensive licensure 
program for nearly all trades and professions. In areas that do not have a state-level 
licensing process, Florida defaults to the national organization that provides credentials 
(for example, project management professionals, logistics, and aircraft pilots). Perhaps 
more importantly, Florida also has the ability to suspend or terminate a professional 
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license should the practitioner abuse their position or be found guilty of malpractice (for 
medical professionals). It should be noted, however, that while the state has the ability to 
forbid a professional from practicing their trade, this is done under the auspices of a 
nongovernmental body such as the Florida Medical Association or the Florida Bar 
Association. Under circumstances that would ordinarily result in the termination of a 
professional license, the state will only act officially if there was a violation of a law not 
administered by such a body. For example, a doctor who intentionally kills a patient 
would be subject to both termination of their medical license and a criminal inquiry. 
Transparency International would be well advised to include within this section a 
provision to ensure that professionals are also subject to appropriate sanctions by a 
licensing body should the situation so dictate.   
  
 The ninth pillar of the National Integrity System is the position of a governmental 
ombudsman (Transparency International, 2000). The Transparency International 
definition of an ombudsman is an entity outside of the regular governmental power 
structure capable of receiving, investigating, and acting upon complaints made by 
members of the public concerning an official function. Florida has several institutions 
with a similar role, except they are created on an almost ad hoc basis and have a wide 
range of names such as Inspector General, the Florida Ethics Commission, hospital 
Patient Advocates, etc. Nearly all elected officials function as ombudsmen for the 
government as well since constituent services is one of the key responsibilities of an 
elected official. In fact, every state legislator has an assistant with the title of Legislative 
Assistant whose job description includes a narrative about the need to receive and 
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respond to constituent concerns (Legislative Assistant, n.d.). Perhaps this differs from 
nation to nation, but one frequently sees the action of a person functioning in the role of 
an ombudsman on behalf of citizens. Media outlets will investigate complaints from 
citizens and consumers, elected officials will also do so, and appointed state employees 
will also perform this function. While these individuals and institutions lack the ability to 
levy sanctions upon those who have failed to provide a service or maliciously performed 
a service, they can remedy the situation nonetheless. Perhaps a better description of this 
section would be the idea that every person in government should function as an 
ombudsman. The need for a separate agency is debatable. This is especially true in a 
developing nation. In the case of Florida, there is an aggressive emphasis in redressing 
the actual and perceived shortcomings of the state government. It should also be noted 
that nearly all government entities are subject to investigations from a Fraud, Waste, and 
Abuse hotline through which citizens can report misappropriation of government funds 
and equipment along with the ability to report government abuse.    
  
 The tenth pillar is the anti-corruption or watchdog agency (Transparency 
International, 2000). This pillar is quite simple to define and explain. In order to reduce 
the political corruption of a given state, it is essential to have a formal apparatus in place 
to combat such corruption. Transparency International suggests that this be accomplished 
through the use of a centralized governmental institution. In the case of Florida, it should 
be noted that the state is structured in such a manner as to have overlapping layers of both 
law enforcement and judicial authority in place to investigate and combat political 
corruption. Generally the state’s Florida Department of Law Enforcement handles 
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investigations related to corruption, a statewide law enforcement entity established to 
provide broad investigatory services to agencies providing law enforcement services to 
Florida’s political subdivisions along with roles related to statewide law enforcement 
issues. Obviously this approach would not work within a governmental system where the 
only source of law enforcement service is a single, national police force, but the 
separation of agencies to the most local level proves to be a beneficial scheme in 
combating corruption. It should be noted that law enforcement agencies, like anti-
corruption agencies, are themselves corruptible. To this end, the Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement can be investigated by a number of external entities such as a grand 
jury or a special prosecutor appointed by the Florida legislature. In the event of a clear-
cut case of political corruption in which additional investigation is not needed, the 
governor has the power to unilaterally remove elected officials from office and appoint a 
replacement for the remainder of a term of office or to call a special election. In the event 
of political or police corruption within a local government, a city would be investigated 
by a county sheriff’s office or by the appropriate State Attorney’s Office and in the event 
of corruption at the level of a State Attorney or County Sheriff, the official would be 
investigated by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Essentially, there are 
overlapping lines of anti-corruption enforcement through out all levels of Florida 
government including the internal investigatory body of the legislature itself, the Ethics 
Committee (Florida House of Representatives, n.d.). Should there be a concern of 
political corruption at the level of the state cabinet or the governor’s office, an 
investigation could be launched by the legislature, which also has the ability to remove a 
sitting governor from office through an impeachment proceeding. Transparency 
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International (2000) specifically asks whether the governor or state executive is within 
the jurisdiction of the anti-corruption agency, a scheme that presents challenges. One 
would think that an ideal arrangement would be for another branch of government to 
have jurisdiction over concerns of political corruption from the very top of the executive 
branch. Keeping this in mind, it would be appropriate for the National Integrity System to 
be updated to include the suggestion that a legislative branch ought to have the power to 
investigate and act upon corruption from the executive branch should it so deem 
appropriate. Another issue that should be included in the National Integrity System is a 
suggestion against a centralized police force or, at the very least, a police force controlled 
by the central government. The unity of all law enforcement activities within a state 
could also produce the unintended consequence of the unity of all law enforcement 
corruption.   
  
 The eleventh and second-to-last pillar in the National Integrity System concerns the 
private sector within a particular state (Transparency International, 2000). The essential 
message in this pillar from Transparency International is that a country’s private sector 
should not be involved in nor should it facilitate political corruption. They are also 
especially concerned with the relative amount of competition within a country’s 
economy. This fits with the essential idea that capitalist economies produce the least 
amount of political corruption. In Florida’s case, there are sectors of the private economy 
in which cartels exist, sectors in which political corruption occurs through the use of legal 
political activity in favor of those who support a company or sector’s economic goals, 
and there are sectors in which this behavior does not occur. One drawback of Florida’s 
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laws on political activity is that a particular policy or law can be bought through fully 
legal methods. For example, if an entire town’s economy is dominated by one 
corporation who employs all of its citizens, the elected bodies will do far more to 
accommodate the interests of this company over those of citizens or competing interests. 
In Florida, such companies include the U.S. Sugar Corporation, the St. Joe Paper 
Company, and the Disney Corporation. In a bit of Devil’s advocate, what happens if one 
of these companies decides that it wants to ignore the laws of a government, but does so 
by having the law changed? While it may be legal, is it corrupt? For the sake of the 
National Integrity System, it would probably be best limited to the scope of governmental 
institutions. Alternatively, the principles of a modified National Integrity System can be 
modified and applied to private corporations in the form of contracts and other binding 
corporate codes of conduct. However, this is beyond the scope of this discussion.   
  
 The twelfth and final pillar of the National Integrity System concerns corruption on 
the part of international actors (Transparency International, 2000). There are two primary 
concerns set forward by Transparency International in this pillar. The first is whether an 
international body is using its influence or funds to expand or further facilitate corruption. 
The second is whether the international community that will then interact with the state in 
a non-corrupt manner is recognizing a legitimate government. Because Florida’s dealings 
with the international community are limited based upon its nature as a political 
subdivision of the United States, discussion on this point cannot be fully accomplished.   
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Case Studies of Political Corruption in Florida 
 
While it may be disconcerting for a voter to find that their representatives 
systemically skew their districts to present an electoral advantage (Fair Districts, n.d.), 
doing so is not against the law in Florida. This situation underscores a critical issue in 
Florida’s political system, the need for clear definition of and test for determining if 
certain actions constitute corruption – ala “if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and 
quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck.” As a matter of public policy, Florida has a 
very strong code of ethics for public officials and a Commission on Ethics with the power 
to investigate and fine elected officials for breaches of the Code of Ethics, as long as it 
receives a citizen complaint. (Commission on Ethics, 2010) Once this has happened, it 
also uses a bully pulpit to bring attention to cases in which an allegation of corruption is 
supported. Florida’s definition aside, the nongovernmental organization Transparency 
International (n.d.) defines “corruption” thusly: 
 
Corruption is operationally defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain. TI further differentiates between "according to rule" corruption and "against 
the rule" corruption. Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive 
preferential treatment for something that the bribe receiver is required to do by 
law, constitute the former. The latter, on the other hand, is a bribe paid to obtain 
services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing. 
 
The key element of this definition is the notion of personal gain. To this end, we 
will be examining several examples of sustained charges of corruption and cases in which 
the appearance – or perception – of personal gain exists without official action or 
investigation into charges. Cases have been selected from the last 30 years from within 
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Florida politics and cover elected and appointed elected officials at the federal and state 
levels. These cases will be used in conjunction with Transparency International’s 
National Integrity System to evaluate corruption in Florida’s political system and to make 
public policy observations and recommendations. These cases also serve as excellent 
examples as to the need for a comprehensive evaluation of political corruption in Florida 
and the United States based upon a rigorous, fixed model.  
 
As reported by the Tampa Bay Times in 2009 (Leary, 2009), the first case 
examines sustained political corruption in the Florida legislature’s budget process and an 
improper relationship between former speaker of the Florida House of Representatives 
Ray Sansom (R-Deerfield Beach, Fla.), a wealthy campaign contributor, Jay Odom, and 
the President of Northwest Florida State College, Bob Richburg. The three defendants 
were indicted on charges of official misconduct related to the construction of a hangar at 
the Destin Airport in Sansom’s legislative district. The grand jury report shows that after 
repeated attempts to obtain state funding for a new hangar at this airport, Sansom 
appropriated funds to the Northwest Florida State College for the purposes of an 
“Emergency Operations Center” at the same airport. Willie Meggs, the Leon County 
State Attorney prosecuting this case argues that because Odom, who contributed heavily 
to Sansom’s political campaigns, could not get this hangar built; he sought to obtain 
funds through a different channel. Sansom, who had been hired (without competition) as 
Vice President for Development at Northwest Florida State College, consulted with 
Richburg and determined that the best avenue for building the hangar was through an 
appropriation to the college. All actors in this stood to gain if it were to be successfully 
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completed. Odom would gain a hangar, Sansom would gain additional campaign 
contributions and a well-paid job at a college, and Richburg would gain Sansom’s 
budgetary experience and, perhaps most importantly, his political contacts. This is quite 
clearly an abuse of an official position on the part of Sansom and Richburg and a bribe 
from Odom. While Odom, Richburg, and Sansom have been indicted twice by grand 
juries (once for official misconduct and once for grand theft and larceny), the charges 
were stalled in light of appeals from the defendants and charges of prosecutorial 
misconduct levied against Jeggs. Ultimately all charges related to this scandal against 
Odom and Sansom were dropped. The only consequences of Sansom’s clear misconduct 
was his resignation from the Speakership of the Florida House of Representatives and the 
loss of his job with Northwest Florida State College. Odom was eventually found guilty 
of a crime when he was found to have reimbursed campaign contributors of former 
Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee’s presidential campaign – circumventing federal 
campaign contribution limits (Morgan, 2013). 
 
Another case of corruption in Florida involves the former federal trial judge (and 
current Congressman) Alcee Hastings. As a federal judge, Hastings presided over a case 
involving Frank and Thomas Romano, brothers charged and convicted with racketeering. 
During the course of the trial, Hastings and a conspirator were alleged to have accepted a 
$150,000.00 bribe from representatives of the defendants in exchange for leniency in 
sentencing and the return of a number of seized properties of the two men. The criminal 
proceedings against Hastings resulted in an acquittal after Hastings’ coconspirator, 
William Borders, refused to testify – resulting in a contempt charge and jail time. 
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Borders’ unwillingness to testify became an issue when Congress took up Hastings’ 
impeachment and voted 413-3 in favor of impeaching the judge. The Senate then took up 
the case and found Hastings guilty of conspiracy and removed him from office on 
October 20, 1989 with a vote of 69-26 (Marcus, 1989). The Senate had the option to 
forever ban Hastings from ever seeking federal office, but declined to do so at the time of 
his conviction. Hastings later filed litigation challenging his impeachment and arguing 
that because he had been found innocent in a criminal court and because he was tried in 
front of the Senate Judiciary Committee and not the full U.S. Senate, Congress’ votes and 
impeachment were invalid. This issue was later resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Nixon v. United States, 506 US 224 (1993) when it ruled that federal courts have no 
jurisdiction over issues of impeachment because the issue is “solely” delegated to the 
legislative branch, which makes a binding, final decision (Nixon v. United States 
Opinion, 1993). Such is the case, Hastings’ impeachment was upheld and in 1992, he 
instead ran for Congress in Florida’s newly created 23rd District. After winning this 
election, was sworn into Congress on January 3, 1993 where he serves to present day 
(Congressman Hastings Website, n.d.). William Borders, the person convicted of paying 
a bribe to (then) Judge Hastings, was given a complete pardon by President Bill Clinton 
during his final weeks in office (U.S. Department of Justice, 2001). While Florida’s 
government is not in a position to exert rules upon federal officials, the case of Alcee 
Hastings is significant for its demonstrative value. The notion that a person can be 
impeached from a position of public trust because of accepting a bribe and later again run 
for and be elected to public office illustrates the very real need for reform within the 
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system and certainly presents a case of perceived corruption for citizens aware of this 
case.  
 
The Latin term quid pro quo makes frequent appearances in political science 
literature and is considered an essential element of government by consensus. It translates 
to “something for something” and is meant to convey the process of logrolling and 
compromise in deliberative bodies. For example, a representative from a rural area would 
vote in favor of legislation related to urban renewal in exchange for a vote on rural 
subsidies from a representative serving an urban area. This behavior allows representative 
bodies to carry out much of their business, however similar behavior between political 
interests can also lead to the appearance of corruption. Such an appearance of a 
seemingly corrupt act presented itself during the 2000 Presidential Election in Florida. 
The first of these, involving former Secretary of State Katherine Harris, concerns the 
propriety of an elected official responsible for elections actively campaigning for a 
candidate subject to their office’s jurisdiction. During the lead-up to the 2000 election, 
Harris served as a co-chair for (then) Governor George W. Bush’s presidential campaign 
(CNN, 2005) while, at the same time serving as Florida’s top elections official. Florida 
has since reduced the size of its elected cabinet and made the Florida Secretary of State 
an appointed position (Florida Governor and Cabinet, n.d.). This was not the case in 2000 
and there were no prohibitions against Harris actively working in favor of one candidate 
when she was responsible for certifying the election. Additionally, once it became 
apparent that a manual recount of ballots in 4 counties that lean in favor of Democrats 
might result in a Democratic victory, she ordered manual recounts to stop. This was a 
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decision overturned by the Florida Supreme Court and later upheld by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Bush v. Gore 538 U.S. 98 (2000). After the 2000 election, Harris completed a 
single term as Secretary of State and went on to run for and be elected to represent 
Florida’s 24th Congressional District. Harris’ case illustrates the appearance of a conflict 
of interest between the partisan political role of an elected official and the official duties 
of the same person. Duty and politics are often inextricably linked, but it is necessary to 
define and separate them under circumstances such as these. While there is little evidence 
of a link between Harris’ performance in the 2000 election and her subsequent election to 
Congress, particularly given the lack of any meaningful institutional Republican support 
for Harris’ 2006 U.S. Senate campaign (Kaczor, 2006), it presents the appearance that 
she was in effect promoted for her decision to stop manual recounts and thus being seen 
as ensuring a victory for George W. Bush’s presidential campaign. After her defeat in the 
2006 U.S. Senate election, Harris later went on to begin construction of a multimillion-
dollar estate in Longboat Key, Fla. and to participate in charity work (Heil, 2012). 
 
The issue of the appearance of corruption or potential improper dealings is a key 
threat to public perceptions of Florida’s political system. Some such cases can be minor 
in nature and not result in any official action while others are examples of actual 
corruption or improper behavior. The cases outlined in this section have not resulted in 
any official action to date nor is there any indication that they have resulted in an official 
complaint or investigation by either the Florida Commission on Ethics or any 
enforcement agency related to the subject, the relationship, or the action. However, this 
being said cases such as the following serve as evidence and justification of the need for a 
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more thorough understanding of corruption in Florida and further guidance and 
legislation related to the issue.  
 
A case that presents a questionable appearance concerns Florida’s current U.S. 
Senator, Bill Nelson. An experienced elected official, Senator Nelson began his career 
with three terms in the Florida House of Representatives, six terms representing Florida 
in Congress, and Florida Treasurer (a position since modified and renamed Chief 
Financial Officer) (Florida Department of Financial Services Organization, n.d.). During 
his time in Congress, Senator Nelson served as the chair of the Space Subcommittee of 
the Science, Space and Technology Committee, which describes its role thusly: 
 
“The Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics has legislative jurisdiction 
and general oversight and investigative authority on all matters relating to 
astronautical and aeronautical research and development including: national space 
policy, including access to space; sub-orbital access and applications; National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration and its contractor and government-
operated labs; space commercialization, including the commercial space activities 
relating to the Department of Transportation and the Department of Commerce; 
exploration and use of outer space; international space cooperation; the National 
Space Council; space applications, space communications and related matters; 
earth remote sensing policy; civil aviation research, development, and 
demonstration; research, development, and demonstration programs of the Federal 
Aviation Administration; and space law.” (Subcommittee on Space, n.d.) 
 
 
While serving as chair of this subcommittee, Nelson had the occasion to fly to 
space aboard the Space Shuttle Columbia as part of NASA’s STS-61-C mission. Nelson 
completed extensive NASA training at government expense prior to his flight and was an 
active crewmember as payload specialist (Nelson & Buckingham, 1988). The opportunity 
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to fly in space would certainly be an exciting adventure and something very few people 
would turn down. From a political perspective, however, it presents a troubling 
appearance and too close a relationship between the chair of an oversight committee and 
the federal agency he is responsible for overseeing. While it is quite common for elected 
officials to ride aboard military aircraft while in a similar capacity over the Department of 
Defense or patronize a national park while overseeing the Department of the Interior, 
spaceflight adds a dimension to this dilemma and raises concerns over the separation 
between the executive and legislative branches of government along with what may very 
well be the most expensive Congressional junket of all time. While NASA would have 
sent the space shuttle into orbit with or without Nelson aboard, one must question 
whether a congressman took a seat that would have otherwise been filled with a trained 
scientist. It should be noted that special interests will attempt to influence the political 
process through illicit campaign contributions, honoraria, and paid vacations, federal 
agencies are capable of the same actions with the same objectives. Perhaps not in the 
United States – and certainly not shown in this case, but in other nations it is feasible for 
a bureaucratic agency to bribe an elected official to make an inquiry disappear or to 
preserve a higher level of funding. Spaceflight hardly constitutes a bribe, but one can 
easily imagine a substantial amount of good will from an oversight committee chairman 
after such an adventure at taxpayer expense.  
 To conclude, we have reviewed four very different examples of what some could 
consider politically questionable behavior with very different outcomes. In the case of 
Ray Sansom, a political career was destroyed and criminal charges were filed while 
Alcee Hastings, who clearly acted improperly and was removed from office by the U.S. 
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Senate managed to complete a remarkable political comeback (Biography: United States 
Representative Alcee L. Hastings, n.d.), becoming more powerful and prominent than he 
had been as a federal judge. From his unlikely stint as a NASA payload specialist, 
Senator Bill Nelson has been twice reelected to the U.S. Senate and features his 
spaceflight in his political biography as an example of hands-on involvement with his 
responsibilities as a senator. Jeb Bush was reelected governor of Florida in 2002 and 
served until he was term limited in January 2007, Katherine Harris was elected to the 
U.S. House of Representatives from Sarasota and Longboat Key in 2002 and served until 
she mounted a campaign for U.S. Senate in 2006, losing to Senator Bill Nelson in the 
general election. These cases provide examples of cases that could be perceived as 
political corruption and cases that were legitimate, illegal corrupt political actions. This 
brings us to a key question: how effective are Florida’s anti-corruption laws and 
institutions? In the cases of Ray Samson and Alcee Hastings, the appropriate 
governmental body was eventually involved and took action to both put an end to the 
corrupt behavior and to eliminate any potential benefit to those involved with the corrupt 
action. Albeit the Hastings affair involved federal authorities, but it remains as an 
example for our purposes because corrupt schemes may not be limited solely to local, 
municipal, county, or state actors. The interesting note about all four of these cases is 
that, even in cases where criminal charges were originally brought, they were ultimately 
dismissed or did not result in serious consequences to the public officials involved in the 
scandals. Cases such as these serve as good examples of situations that could result in an 
increased perception of political corruption among the residents of Florida. 
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CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The adventure that is Florida’s relationship with political corruption is truly as 
long and winding as the state’s 8,436 miles of coastline (NOAA, 2012) and viewed from 
as many perspectives as the 19,317,568 people who call Florida home (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2013). Such is the case; it is impossible to discuss even a tiny percentage of the 
instances of real and perceived political corruption that occur within its borders. We have 
learned that political corruption is a timeless aspect of government – as much a question 
of the law and specific actions of individuals as it is a question of morality and ethics. We 
have also seen the immense challenges posed to researchers as they seek to define, 
identify, and analyze this perennial issue in political science. It seems that the relatively 
simple question of what constitutes corrupt action on its face is in fact a dense question 
riddled with nuance and mystery.  
 
 If Florida’s experience with combating political corruption is any indication of the 
perplexing nature of this issue, consider two major changes made to Florida’s 
constitution in response to alleged or perceived corruption: the 1992 amendment 
implementing term limits on elective office and the 2010 amendments implementing “fair 
districts” in Florida’s congressional and legislative redistricting process. Both of these 
amendments passed by comfortable margins (term limits with 76.77% of the vote and fair 
districts with 62.59% and 62.91% of the vote for each of the amendments) and address 
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specific governmental concerns. (Florida Division of Elections, n.d.) From the text of the 
term limits amendment itself, one can see that it endeavored to keep elected officials 
from being more concerned with reelection than they were their constituents. (Florida 
Division of Elections, n.d.) Looking back at the implementation of this amendment, we 
have seen dramatically increased influence of lobbyists, legislative staffs, and political 
action committees – the actors whose’ influence the amendment was designed to reduce 
(Carsey and Nelson, 2008, p. 108) (Wagner and Prier, 2008, p. 159-160). In the case of 
the “Fair Districts” amendments, it is obvious that the concern of gerrymandering safe 
districts for representatives who are not representative of their districts was a key element 
to its success.  Conversely, the “Fair Districts” campaign was designed as a response to 
the creation of political districts favoring one political party over another or one ethnicity 
over another (majority-minority districts). (Wagner and Prier, 2008) However noble this 
initiative may have been, it came with electoral consequences – namely giving additional 
advantage to the minority party in the redistricting process. Immediately following the 
2012 general election, one of the first questions posed in the media was how much the 
Fair Districts amendments had benefitted the Democratic Party and its candidates 
(Associated Press, 2012). The lesson here is that one must always consider the wider 
effects of reforms in the name of anti-corruption or government reform. When it comes to 
the question of corruption, it is not unprecedented for governments to use anti-corruption 
rhetoric as an avenue to discredit or eliminate their opposition (Duhamel, 2004). Such is 
the case, would-be reformers and anti-corruption crusaders must be mindful of the 
motivations of prominent supporters as well as the broader political context in a state 
before working aggressively for policy changes.  
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 Based upon the results of the term limits and redistricting amendments, it is 
reasonable to extrapolate that Florida’s voters have both a deep and long-lasting interest 
in governmental reform. This has given rise to organizations (and a cautionary tale) such 
as Integrity Florida, which markets itself as “a nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute 
and government watchdog whose mission is to promote integrity in government and 
expose public corruption” (Integrity Florida, n.d.). Integrity Florida combines research 
into public corruption and institutions in Florida with an advocacy role in which those 
reading their reports are able to quickly contact elected officials to urge specific reforms. 
The combination of pseudo-think tank and advocacy group presents a credibility problem 
for this group with a mission of tackling corruption in a nonpartisan fashion. This is 
particularly true when Integrity Florida seeks sponsorship from other organizations to 
support its research mission. One recent example was the decision to accept funds from a 
group called Americans for Prosperity; an organization closely tied to conservative 
political causes, to prepare a research report on Enterprise Florida, the state’s public-
private business development corporation. A possible perception of this action is that 
Integrity Florida accepted payment to produce a report supportive of the research 
sponsor’s conservative political agenda. Doing so would allow Americans for Prosperity 
to adopt a nonpartisan mantle while advancing an argument against government business 
incentives (Bousquet, 2013). Even the perception of such an arrangement serves to 
delegitimize Integrity Florida as a nonpartisan organization and resulted in dueling 
resignations from the Integrity Florida Board of Directors and the Board of Directors of 
the First Amendment Foundation (Bousquet, 2013). While one must concede that 
sponsorship is needed for extensive research projects, it is necessary to ensure that 
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sponsors of research have no financial, political, or rhetorical interest in the outcome of 
the research that they are supporting.  
 
 Beyond the significant issues in standardizing data and ranking the states 
themselves that were discussed earlier lies still another difficulty in preparing research in 
political corruption: the constantly changing landscape of the issue. There is always an 
exciting scandal just breaking, there are always new laws, and there are always new and 
innovative corrupt actions. Given the shifting topography of this field, it comes at no 
great surprise that there are also new ideas and initiatives for resolving corruption or 
improving transparency or some other well-meaning government reform. The interesting 
caveat to all of this is that the answers to the perplexing questions of combating and 
preventing political corruption aren’t great mysteries in need of an Indiana Jones-esque 
crusader to unearth them from an ancient cave in Florida’s aquifer – policy remedies have 
been prepared based upon exhaustive, state-sponsored studies twice in the last thirteen 
years. In 1999, the state created the Public Corruption Study Commission at the request 
of then-Governor Jeb Bush. This commission returned a report with thorough information 
on the nature of political corruption in Florida and several remedies ready for adoption by 
the legislature. As if this were not enough, the Nineteenth Statewide Grand Jury was 
convened in 2010 at the request of then-Governor Charlie Crist to update the previous 
study and to provide new policy remedies for addressing and preventing corrupt political 
activity in Florida.  
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 Taken together, the key recommendations from both the 1999 Public Corruption 
Study Commission Report and the 2010 Nineteenth Statewide Grand Jury are the same: 
criminalize public corruption violations of the Florida Code of Ethics, ensure clearer 
tracking of corruption offenses, and update the law to ensure stiffer penalties for public 
servants who abuse their positions of trust. Additionally, the single largest failure of 
Florida’s anti-corruption strategy is the perplexing inability of the Florida Commission 
on Ethics to launch its own investigations and to impose severe civil penalties on those 
who violate the Code of Ethics. These relatively small changes to Florida Statutes would 
allow State Attorneys, criminal enforcement agencies, and the Commission on Ethics to 
be far more aggressive in addressing, preventing, and reducing political corruption. As 
we have seen with the tremendous success of ballot initiatives designed to reform 
government and reduce corruption, Florida’s voters support strong anti-corruption laws 
and aggressive enforcement.  
 
 In sum, political corruption is the unending problem that faces governments and 
peoples the world over. Corruption perpetuates poverty, it sows seeds of distrust in 
democratic government, and it stands in the way of development not just in the 
developing world, but also in places like the United States. In Florida, voters have 
demonstrated a sincere desire to reduce perceived corruption in Florida’s government, but 
those in power refuse to seriously consider the most pressing suggestions of either the 
Public Corruption Study Commission or the Nineteenth Statewide Grand Jury. Since 
1999, we have yet to see strengthened criminal statutes and a Commission on Ethics 
allowed to act as a true anti-corruption agency. Until these changes are fully 
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implemented, one can only expect Florida’s political elite to scratch their heads and 
wonder why Florida has once again topped the list of states with the most federal 
corruption convictions – a questionable statistic in and of itself that has resulted in 
Florida’s inaccurate distinction of being the most corrupt state in the United States. 
 
 The key findings of this analysis have been illuminating not just into Florida’s 
perspective on political corruption, but on the academic work researching comparative 
corruption in the United States. We have learned that a remarkable number of studies cite 
the same data either from the U.S. Department of Justice or from Boylan & Long’s 2003 
journalist survey. We have seen that a combined approach considering data from 
academic, governmental, journalistic, and nongovernmental sources focused on both state 
and federal convictions, institutions, and perceptions add accuracy to state-by-state 
rankings of corruption. This success aside, the single largest lesson of this analysis has 
been that there is a need for further research into comparative political corruption in the 
United States – particularly in devising new indices and sources of data. We have also 
seen that the definition of corruption is of equal importance to the data used for its 
analysis.  
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